

# EXHIBIT W

# FROM REPRESENTATION TO INCLUSION:

Diversity Leadership for  
the 21st-Century Military

FINAL REPORT



# **FROM REPRESENTATION TO INCLUSION:**

**Diversity Leadership for  
the 21st-Century Military**

**FINAL REPORT**



**MILITARY LEADERSHIP DIVERSITY COMMISSION**

**1851 South Bell Street  
Arlington, VA 22202**



March 15, 2011

The Honorable Barack Obama, President of the United States  
The 112th United States Congress

Mr. President and Members of Congress:

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 established the Military Leadership Diversity Commission. The Commission was asked to conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies and practices that shape diversity among military leaders. Sixteen interrelated tasks, given by Congress, informed the Commission's enclosed final report, *From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military*. As chairman of this Commission, I am proud to present this report for your consideration.

The Commission held itself to high standards of openness and transparency in all deliberations. Moreover, we modeled inclusiveness by inviting those with diverse backgrounds, expertise, and experience to have a say in our independent analysis. The Commission sought extensive input for our deliberations from the Department of Defense and the Services as well as the private sector. We hosted 13 public hearings, meeting in locations across the country where many active-duty servicemembers and veterans reside. We heard public testimony from top military leaders, subject matter experts, and diversity officers from leading corporations known for their diversity practices. In addition, we conducted interviews with servicemembers.


The Commission believes that the diversity of our servicemembers is the unique strength of our military. Current and future challenges can be better met by broadening our understanding of diversity and by effectively leading our uniformed men and women in ways that fully leverage their differences. While we find the promotion policies and practices of the Department of Defense and the Services to be fair, we find also that there are some barriers to improving demographic representation among military leaders.

Among the 20 recommendations given in this report is a new definition of diversity for the 21st century. We offer ways to remove barriers that are affecting the demographic

makeup of military leadership, and we suggest approaches to leadership, education, and assessment that can enable the Department of Defense and the Services to fully benefit from the increased diversity of military leadership. We are confident that these recommendations will positively shape our military leadership in ways that meet the unique challenges of this century. However, the Commission recognizes that presidential and congressional guidance and support are necessary if success is to be realized.

It has been both an honor and privilege for this Commission to support the U.S. military's continuing journey of becoming a preeminently inclusive institution.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Lester L. Lyles".

Lester L. Lyles, Chairman  
Military Leadership Diversity Commission

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
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FROM REPRESENTATION TO INCLUSION: DIVERSITY LEADERSHIP FOR THE 21ST-CENTURY MILITARY

**Former Commissioners**

Kathlene Contreras  


Isabella Pinckney  


## PREFACE

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The U.S. Armed Forces became a deliberately inclusive organization in 1948, when President Harry S. Truman issued his historic Executive Order 9981 that called for “equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services” (The White House, 1948). Since then, the U.S. military force has endeavored to become an inclusive organization dedicated to the equality of all its members, regardless of their background. Its dedication to equal opportunity has resulted in increased representation of racial/ethnic minorities and women among the top military leaders in recent decades. Despite undeniable successes, however, the Armed Forces have not yet succeeded in developing a continuing stream of leaders who are as diverse as the Nation they serve. Racial/ethnic minorities and women still lag behind non-Hispanic white men in terms of representative percentage of military leadership positions held. Marked changes in the demographic makeup of the United States will throw existing disparities into sharp relief, creating a recruiting pool that looks very different from the pool of 30–40 years ago, from which today’s leaders were drawn.

Recognizing existing disparities and seeking to look ahead, Congress, in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 596, mandated the creation of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC). The Commission was tasked to “conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces, including minority members who are senior officers.” Its charter required that a final report be delivered directly to the President and Congress one year after its first meeting.

An independent deliberative body, the Commission was itself an inclusive organization. Military Commissioners were active-duty and retired officers and senior enlisted personnel from both the Active and Reserve Components of all the Armed Forces, including the Coast Guard, as well as civilians. They included those who served in major armed conflicts from World War II to Iraq and Afghanistan. Civilian Commissioners included senior executives of major corporations, civil servants, and a law school chancellor.

The Commission’s charter listed 16 specific tasks. To address these tasks, the Commission was divided into ten subcommittees, each supported by a research team. Each subcommittee produced issue papers on specific topics and a decision paper that reports the subcommittee’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Legal Implications Subcommittee did not produce a decision paper because the Commission made no recommendations specific to the subcommittee’s findings. Rather, those findings served to inform all of the Commission’s recommendations.

FROM REPRESENTATION TO INCLUSION: DIVERSITY LEADERSHIP FOR THE 21ST-CENTURY MILITARY

This final report, founded on rigorous research and enhanced by serious and open deliberation, presents the Commission's main findings and recommends policies and practices to develop future military leaders who represent the face of America.

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# SUMMARY

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This report presents the findings and recommendations of the MLDC. Under the provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 596, Congress asked the Commission to “conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces, including minority members who are senior officers.” Congress charged the Commission to carry out 16 interrelated tasks. The nonpartisan, deliberative body of military and civilian leaders researched, reflected on, and recommended improvements to existing diversity-related policies and offered new initiatives designed to be supportive of the missions and goals of the Department of Defense (DoD).

The Commission’s recommendations support two overriding and related objectives: (1) that the Armed Forces systematically develop a demographically diverse leadership that reflects the public it serves and the forces it leads and (2) that the Services pursue a broader approach to diversity that includes the range of backgrounds, skill sets, and personal attributes that are necessary to enhancing military performance.

The Commission acknowledges that the Services have been leaders in providing opportunities for all servicemembers, regardless of their racial/ethnic background or gender. Today’s mission-effective force is a living testament to progress in the areas of military equal opportunity policies and related recruiting and management tactics. However, more needs to be done to address 21st-century challenges.

The Armed Forces have not yet succeeded in developing a continuing stream of leaders who are as demographically diverse as the Nation they serve. Current projections suggest that the proportion of racial/ethnic minority youth will increase in this century, while the proportion of non-Hispanic white youth will decline. More importantly, racial/ethnic minorities and women are still underrepresented among the Armed Forces’ top leadership, compared with the servicemembers they lead. This disparity will become starkly obvious without the successful recruitment, promotion, and retention of racial/ethnic minorities among the enlisted force. Without sustained attention, this problem will only become more acute as the racial/ethnic and cultural makeup of the United States continues to change.

The Armed Forces must also acknowledge that diversity encompasses more than demographics, and they must take action to harness the range of knowledge, skills, and backgrounds needed to prevail in the rapidly changing operational environment. Leaders will need to address complex and uncertain emergent threats. For example,

[D]espite our progress today, too many people still suffer from what I call the *illusion of inclusion*, which is a condition you get when you rest on past laurels.

—The Honorable Claiborne Haughton, Jr.,  
remarks to the Commission, 2010

## FROM REPRESENTATION TO INCLUSION: DIVERSITY LEADERSHIP FOR THE 21ST-CENTURY MILITARY

And the issue that we're talking about here today—diversity—is a readiness issue. Sustaining our all-volunteer force is a readiness issue.

—The Honorable Clifford Stanley,  
remarks to the Commission, 2010

in meeting such challenges and will require greater foreign-language, regional, and cultural skills. In that vein, expert testimony comes from General James Mattis, then-Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command. Closing out the 2010 Joint Warfighting Conference, he stated,

In this age, I don't care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if you cannot create harmony—even vicious harmony—on the battlefield based on trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian/military lines, you really need to go home, because your leadership in today's age is obsolete. We have got to have officers who can create harmony across all those lines. (quoted in Boyer, 2010)

To address these challenges, the Commission proposes 20 recommendations to

- establish a definition of diversity that addresses the complexity of today's environment
- build a foundation for change by ensuring leadership commitment to diversity
- develop and maintain a qualified and demographically diverse military leadership
- ensure continued progress through policy goals and metrics that allow DoD to manage and sustain diversity.

## Define Diversity for a New Era

Currently, each Service defines *diversity* differently. Developing a uniform definition of diversity to be used throughout DoD can inspire a common vision and elicit the needed changes. The Commission's recommended definition, presented below, brings together DoD's core values and the core values of each Service, and it addresses today's unique mission and demographic challenges:

*Diversity is all the different characteristics and attributes of individuals that are consistent with Department of Defense core values, integral to overall readiness and mission accomplishment, and reflective of the Nation we serve.*

The definition acknowledges that individuals come to the military not only with different cultural backgrounds but also with different skills, experiences, and talents. It also acknowledges that these differences are operationally relevant. With proper leadership, diversity can increase military agility and responsiveness.

The definition is consistent with equal opportunity policies and practices. If policies resulting from the new definition are properly communicated, implemented, and assessed, the new concept will help to further eliminate discrimination and guide DoD along a path of inclusion.

## Build the Foundation for Change

Leveraging diversity as a vital strategic military resource will require the commitment, vision, and know-how of leaders at every level. Without this commitment to instill respect for diversity as a core value, the needed cultural change may not take place.

### Ensure Leadership Commitment to Diversity

Diversity leadership must become a core competency at all levels of the Armed Forces, and respect for diversity should be made an explicit core value of DoD and the Services. An effective leader promotes fairness and equity in his or her organization or work-group and knows how to focus a broadly diverse group to use its members' differences in ways that benefit the mission. Getting a diverse group to work together in ways that improve mission capabilities is a learned skill. The Services should provide diversity leadership education and training, distinct from traditional forms of general diversity training, to servicemembers at every level.

This requires a fundamental shift in institutional thinking about diversity. One clear message comes from both the literature on diversity management and the experience of organizations with a strong reputation for diversity: Such a shift requires the personal and visible commitment of top leaders. The Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service Secretaries and Chiefs, and senior enlisted leaders will be critical to implementing the kind of change needed to inspire and manage reform.

To meet emerging operational challenges, the Services need to identify and reward the range of skills required for mission success. To endure, the new understanding of diversity as a way to enhance mission effectiveness must become inherent in military culture and in the military's way of doing business.

Commitment to change is expressed fully by national leaders when new goals and values are made into law. Consistent with this insight, the Commission recommends that Congress revise Title 10, Section 113, to require the Secretary of Defense to report annually on the status and progress of DoD's diversity efforts.

I've always considered myself, in addition to being the commander, a safety officer of every organization I led. That was something I couldn't hand off to anybody else. And the second thing that I always considered myself as being was the diversity officer . . . Yes, there are other people who had staff responsibilities for all of this, but ultimately, those two responsibilities I saw as my own, because they are consequential of good and strong leadership.

—The Honorable Eric Shinseki,  
remarks to the Commission, 2010

## Develop Future Leaders

The Commission found that top military leaders are representative neither of the population they serve nor of the forces they lead. The extent to which racial/ethnic minorities and women are underrepresented varies across the Services, but the Commission found, on average, low racial/ethnic minority and female representation among senior military officers.

During the Vietnam War, the lack of diversity in military leadership led to problems that threatened the integrity and performance of the Nation's military (Becton et al., 2003). This is because servicemembers' vision of what is possible for their career is shaped by whether they see individuals with similar backgrounds excelling and being recognized in their Service. The performance of the Nation's military is tied to the individual's belief that he or she will be treated fairly regardless of his or her background.

The Commission found four explanations for discrepancies in representation among senior military leaders: low racial/ethnic minority and female presence among initial officer accessions, lower representation of racial/ethnic minority and female officers in career fields associated with advancement to flag/general officer rank, lower retention of midlevel female servicemembers across the enlisted and officer spectrum, and lower rates of advancement among racial/ethnic minority and female officers. To address these issues, the Commission recommends the actions summarized below.

## Increase the Pool of Eligible Candidates

Recent statistics from the Pentagon show that three out of four young people ages 17–24 are not eligible to enlist in the military (Gilroy, 2009). Many fail to meet entry requirements related to education, test scores, citizenship, health status, and past criminal history. Further, racial/ethnic minorities are less likely to meet eligibility requirements than are non-Hispanic whites, and that gap is widening. This is a national security issue requiring the attention and collected effort of top public officials, such as the President, members of Congress, and State and local leaders, all of whom can turn the tide by developing and executing strong, united, action-oriented programs to improve eligibility among the youth population. Together, these officials and other stakeholders, such as DoD, the Department of Education, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Homeland Security, can and should improve educational and physical readiness among American youth and foster new interest in military service.

## Improve Outreach and Recruiting Strategies

In the military's closed personnel system, tomorrow's leaders are developed and selected from today's recruits. Recognizing this constraint, the Services employ a variety of strategies to attract qualified youth to enlist or join officer commissioning programs, such as the Service academies, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, and Officer Candidate School/Officer Training School programs. The Commission's review of recent accessions revealed that, in each Service, at least one racial/ethnic minority group was underrepresented. The review also revealed that women were underrepresented across

all the Services. The Commission's recommendations include that DoD and the Services explore untapped recruiting markets, require accountability for recruiting from underrepresented demographic groups, and develop a common application for Service academies and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps.

### **Eliminate Barriers to Career Advancement**

Increasing the racial/ethnic and gender diversity of senior leadership requires eliminating barriers that disproportionately affect the advancement of racial/ethnic minorities and women. This can be done on two levels. First, the Services should ensure that all servicemembers are equally well prepared to manage their own career progression. Related preparation steps include educating all servicemembers about the promotion process early in their careers and mentoring them at all stages of the career process. Multiple occasions for preparation can help servicemembers recognize career-enhancing opportunities and make choices that further their professional and personal goals.

Second, DoD and the Services must remove institutional barriers in order to open traditionally closed doors, especially those relating to assignments—both the initial career field assignment and subsequent assignments to key positions. An important step in this direction is that DoD and the Services eliminate combat exclusion policies for women, including removing barriers and inconsistencies, to create a level playing field for all servicemembers who meet the qualifications.

### **Ensure Continued Progress**

The changes recommended by the Commission cannot be managed or sustained without developing a stronger organizational structure and a system of accountability, monitoring, and enforcement.

### **Realign the Organizational Structure**

Currently, responsibility for DoD diversity management falls under the Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity. This office is understaffed, isolated from top leadership, and unable to set the agenda or drive progress. The central feature of the new accountability system proposed by the Commission is the Chief Diversity Officer. This new position will report directly to the Secretary of Defense to ensure that diversity management is embraced as a “line” rather than “staff” responsibility. The second key feature of this system is a set of mutually reinforcing elements that work together to provide effective, consistent implementation and persistent accountability for achieving the goals of diversity and inclusion. Supported by the existing Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) Research & Analysis office, which will be enhanced to deal with diversity-related issues, the Chief Diversity Officer will monitor and advise on all facets of the system for the Secretary of Defense.

## FROM REPRESENTATION TO INCLUSION: DIVERSITY LEADERSHIP FOR THE 21ST-CENTURY MILITARY

**Institute a System of Accountability**

The Secretary of Defense will oversee the diversity effort of DoD and the Services through annual accountability reviews with the Service Secretaries, Chiefs, and senior enlisted leaders. In parallel, the Deputy Secretary of Defense will convene biannually the Deputy's Advisory Working Group to discuss the status and progress of diversity efforts throughout the Armed Forces. Finally, to ensure consistent implementation of the new diversity vision, each of the Service Chiefs will hold internal accountability reviews prior to meeting with the Secretary of Defense. Reviews will be conversations that focus on progress and areas for improvement. They will enable military leadership not only to see evidence about demographics but also to take stock of the diversity awareness and leadership of those in line to succeed current leaders. In particular, the reviews will provide a forum for senior leaders to assess whether and how leaders at lower levels are leveraging all types of diversity in their units to improve capability.

**Ensure the Succession of Leaders Committed to Diversity**

To ensure that the diversity effort continues, demonstrated diversity leadership must be assessed throughout careers and made, in both DoD and the Senate, a criterion for nomination and confirmation to the 3- and 4-star ranks. Individuals considered for top leadership positions should be able to demonstrate their experience in providing diversity leadership and their understanding of its connection to readiness and mission accomplishment.

**Develop and Implement Robust Policies and Strategic Metrics**

Successful implementation of diversity initiatives requires a deliberate strategy that ties the new diversity vision to desired outcomes via policies and metrics. DoD must revise and reissue existing equal opportunity policies, formalize the new diversity management goals in clear and robust policies, and clarify what the Services must do to meet those goals. At the same time, appropriate metrics and reporting tools must be put in place to ensure that progress is made. With such data and tools, military leaders at all levels can be held accountable for their performance in diversity management and rewarded for their efforts.

**Conclusion**

Today's military operations are executed in complex, uncertain, and rapidly changing environments. Men and women representative of the U.S. population and with different skills, experiences, and backgrounds are needed to respond to new and emerging threats. To harness these differences in ways that increase operational effectiveness, the military must revise and develop policies consistent with the new diversity vision. Diversity needs to work—for the good of the Nation and of the Armed Forces that serve it.

Joint operations, imposed by Congress on an unwilling military 25 years ago, have since become a large-scale example of the strength that comes with diversity.

## SUMMARY

These operations do not level or eliminate each Service's unique traditions and capabilities: Each Service maintains its culture, heritage, and ways of engaging in battle and peacekeeping missions. Integrating the Services' differences into a single coordinated force is difficult, and the U.S. military has spent considerable time and funding to make joint effort possible. Despite challenges, however, joint operations have demonstrated that a seamless integration of differences can be accomplished and can positively influence the outcome of the fight.

The ultimate impact of the recommendations in this report depends on the unwavering commitment of the President of the United States, the resolute conviction of the Secretary of Defense, and the concerted effort of military leaders at all levels to bring about enduring change. The MLDC is the third deliberative body established by an external authority to find ways to transform the U.S. military to become a more inclusive institution. Its predecessors were the Fahy Committee (1949–1950), created by President Harry S. Truman, and the Gesell Committee (1962), appointed by President John F. Kennedy. Historians have hailed the Fahy Committee as instrumental in desegregating the Armed Forces and thus paving the way for the Nation to move closer to its ideals. On the other hand, few even remember that the Gesell Committee existed, despite the fact that it recommended policies that might have enabled the military to avoid the harmful racial tensions and conflicts that occurred in the Armed Forces during the Vietnam War.

The U.S. military is a learning organization capable of adapting to change and the needs of the Nation, provided that the Nation's highest leaders are willing both to change and to provide a clear vision of success that is followed by the sustained oversight needed to succeed. The Armed Forces have led the Nation in the struggle to achieve equality. To maintain this leadership, they must evolve once again, renewing their commitment to providing equal opportunity for all. The time has come to embrace the broader concept of diversity needed to achieve military goals and to move the Nation closer to embodying its democratic ideals.



## ABBREVIATIONS

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AC	Active Component
AFQT	Armed Forces Qualification Test
ANG	Air National Guard
ARNG	Army National Guard
CDO	Chief Diversity Officer
CEO	chief executive officer
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CONOPS	concept of operations
DACOWITS	Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services
DAWG	Deputy's Advisory Working Group
DEOC	Defense Equal Opportunity Council
DEOCS	DEOMI Organizational Climate Survey
DEOMI	Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DMDC	Defense Manpower Data Center
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	DoD Directive
DUSD(EO)	Deputy Under Secretary (Equal Opportunity)
EEO	equal employment opportunity
EO	equal opportunity
FY	fiscal year
GED	General Educational Development
JROTC	Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps

## FROM REPRESENTATION TO INCLUSION: DIVERSITY LEADERSHIP FOR THE 21ST-CENTURY MILITARY

K-12	kindergarten through grade 12
MAVNI	Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest
MLDC	Military Leadership Diversity Commission
NH	non-Hispanic
OCS	Officer Candidate School
ODMEO	Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTS	Officer Training School
PI	Pacific Islander
RC	Reserve Component
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SOFS	Status of Forces Survey
USA	U.S. Army
USAF	U.S. Air Force
USAFR	U.S. Air Force Reserve
USAR	U.S. Army Reserve
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USCGR	U.S. Coast Guard Reserve
USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
USMCR	U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
USN	U.S. Navy
USNR	U.S. Navy Reserve
WEOA	Workplace and Equal Opportunity Survey of Active-Duty Members

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## **SECTION I: INTRODUCTION**

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CHAPTER ONE

## ABOUT THE STUDY

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The U.S. Armed Forces have played a pivotal role in the Nation's pursuit of equality of opportunity for all citizens. In 1948, after the end of World War II, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces President Harry S. Truman issued his historic Executive Order 9981. The order called for the desegregation of the Armed Forces by providing "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services" (The White House, 1948). Since then, the U.S. military has become a groundbreaking institution that is dedicated to the ideal that individual servicemembers should be rewarded for their performance and dedication, no matter their gender, skin color, ethnic background, or religion. This dedication to equal opportunity has resulted in the increased representation of racial/ethnic minorities and women at all ranks of the military, including among top leadership positions. Today, the Armed Forces have made impressive progress toward President Truman's vision of an inclusive military that reflects the ideals of the Nation it serves.

Despite this progress, however, the transformation of the Armed Forces remains unfinished. *Racial/ethnic minorities and women are still underrepresented in leadership positions.* Demographic changes in the United States are reshaping the pool from which the Services will recruit and promote future military leaders. Prolonged conflicts of unprecedented complexity require agile leadership that leverages all the capabilities at its disposal. Like the private sector, the U.S. military recognizes the need for a diverse workforce that includes a greater range of individual competencies, including skills, education, and professional backgrounds. Recognizing the needs of the new era, Congress mandated the creation of the Department of Defense (DoD) Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC).

The Commission, an advisory body of active and retired military, academic, and corporate leaders, was tasked in its charter to "conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces, including minority members who are senior officers."<sup>1</sup> This final report presents the results of that evaluation. It examines policies affecting the career life cycles of military personnel from the five Services—the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—as well as the National Guard and Reserve. The report outlines a vision, strategy, and action plan for improving the inclusiveness of military leadership.

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<sup>1</sup> The charter is reproduced in Appendix A. The Commissioners are listed in Appendix B.

## Background

The MLDC is the third deliberative body established by an external authority to find ways to transform the U.S. military to become a more inclusive institution. As this Commission offers its report to the President of the United States and Congress, the Nation's top military leaders, and the American public, it is worth reflecting on the lessons learned from the two previous committees.

### The Fahy Committee

When President Truman declared that widespread racial/ethnic discrimination would be abolished in the Armed Forces, he stated that the new policy was to be “put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale” (The White House, 1948). He assigned responsibility for ensuring rapid implementation to the newly formed President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity, which was commonly known as the Fahy Committee (after its chair). The order stated,

The Committee is authorized on behalf of the President to examine into the rules, procedures and practices of the armed services in order to determine in what respect such rules, procedures and practices may be altered or improved with a view to carrying out the policy of this order. (The White House, 1948)

From January 1949 to July 1950, the Fahy Committee, which comprised three white and two black civilians, “advised, encouraged, and prodded each of the armed services into at least nominal compliance with the administration’s expectations regarding Executive Order 9981” (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998). Although the committee had no formal administrative power, President Truman made it clear to all stakeholders that he stood behind its effort. In January 1949, at the first meeting of the committee, he said, “I want this job done. And I want to get it done in a way so everybody will be happy to cooperate to get it done. Unless it is necessary to knock somebody’s ears down, I don’t want to do that, but if it becomes necessary, it can be done. But that’s about all I have to tell you” (quoted in Mershon & Schlossman, 1998).

The direct support it received from the President sets the Fahy Committee apart from all other such deliberative bodies. With President Truman’s unequivocal support, the Fahy Committee brought about lasting changes to the U.S. military that went beyond desegregation. For instance, the Fahy Committee’s systematic analysis exposed some long-held beliefs about policies toward racial/ethnic minorities in the Armed Forces and their impact on mission effectiveness. The Fahy Committee’s findings also debunked an assertion that any inclusive policy designed to expand opportunities for blacks must come at the expense of other people and at the expense of the general welfare. More importantly, the findings showed that a more inclusive military that enables all members to use their talents and skills to the fullest is a more effective fighting force.

Despite this progress, however, desegregation of the military in the following years was neither smooth nor consistent. Official racial segregation in the military was not fully revoked until 1954, four years after President Truman dismissed the committee in a compromise with Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998). The momentum to desegregate was sustained during the Korean War and brought to completion by military leaders in the theater, such as General Matthew B. Ridgeway (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998). But this momentum was difficult to sustain after the war, particularly because the U.S. military was ahead of the Nation in terms of race relations in the late 1950s (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998).

### **The Gesell Committee**

In recognition of the need to revitalize efforts to expand opportunities for racial/ethnic minorities in the military, President John F. Kennedy established a new investigative body in 1962, the President's Committee on Equality of Opportunity in the Armed Forces, which was commonly known as the Gesell Committee (after its chair). All seven members were civilians, and three were black (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998). The committee was asked to assess the status of blacks in the military and to find ways to improve their opportunities. More specifically, the committee addressed two questions:

- What measures should be taken to improve the effectiveness of current policies and procedures in the Armed Forces with regard to equality of treatment and opportunity for persons in the Armed Forces?
- What measures should be employed to improve equality of opportunity for members of the Armed Forces and their dependents in the civilian community, particularly with respect to housing, education, transportation, recreational facilities, community events, programs, and activities?

The Gesell Committee's report, released in 1964, called for "far-reaching proposals for greater institutionalization of the military's commitment to equality of treatment and opportunity." The Gesell Committee considered military commanders to be the central agents in this process. For instance, it proposed that "DoD establish a system for monitoring race relations. . . . Under this system, commanders would be held responsible for ensuring that race relations received continuous attention, and would be evaluated on their handling of racial matters." More important, according to Mershon and Schlossman (1998), the Gesell Committee "insisted that the results of such evaluations be incorporated into the regular promotion process," writing the following: "It should be made clear [that] officers showing initiative and achievement in this area will enhance their performance ratings and obtain favorable consideration for promotion and career advancement" (all Gesell Committee report quotations from Mershon & Schlossman, 1998).

Unlike the Fahy Committee, the Gesell Committee did not directly report to the President. Moreover, whereas the Fahy Committee was asked to implement a policy of the President, the Gesell Committee was asked to recommend new policies to the Sec-

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retary of Defense. The Gesell Committee released its final report in 1964. The committee's recommendations to institutionalize the inclusive ideals in the U.S. military are still relevant today, especially because they were never fully implemented.

Unfortunately, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara chose not to implement all of the Gesell Committee's recommendations. Instead, he issued DoD Directive (DoDD) 5120.36, *Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces*, which addressed the recommendations related to the second question—but not the first—and dealt with external issues to address how DoD should deal with the fact that many institutions in the country remained racially segregated while the military had already ended segregation (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998).

Unlike the Fahey Committee, which is recognized for its historic achievements, the Gesell Committee is little known. Its recommendations, if implemented, would have institutionalized the process of monitoring and evaluating progress in race relations and equal opportunity within the military and the accountability system. However, Secretary McNamara failed to implement the recommendations that might have enabled the Armed Forces to avoid the harmful racial tensions and conflicts that occurred in the decades that followed.

DoD's failure to implement the Gesell Committee's recommendations had high costs. Inequities persisted at all levels of the military, particularly in the leadership ranks. The negative effects of such inequities were detailed in the 2003 amicus brief submitted by Becton et al. to the Supreme Court in the cases of *Gratz v. Bollinger* and *Grutter v. Bollinger*, which addressed whether the treatment of race as a favorable factor in admissions decisions at the University of Michigan Law School was constitutional. The brief—filed by 29 former military and civilian leaders, including several retired 4-star generals, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretaries of Defense—recounted that the lack of diversity in military leadership led to problems that threatened the integrity and performance of the Nation's military: “[T]he armed forces suffered increased racial polarization, pervasive disciplinary problems, and racially motivated incidents in Vietnam and on posts around the world” because the percentage of minority officers was “extremely low” relative to the percentage of blacks among the enlisted ranks (Becton et al., 2003).

### **The Military Diversity Leadership Commission**

The MLDC is building on the legacy of the two previous committees in the hope that the Nation's political and military leaders will embrace its recommendations so that a new commission on this subject will not be needed in the years ahead. The Commission has tackled the same issues as its predecessors and has focused on military leadership. It has also addressed two important trends of the past decade that may become more pronounced in the future: the growing demographic diversity of the American population and the sophisticated challenges of current warfare that require a broader set of qualifications in its leaders. Congress asked the Commission to reconsider the concept of diversity with these trends in mind.

The Commission recommends an expanded definition of diversity and a modern, systematic approach to diversity management in DoD. The new definition goes beyond

the traditional concept of diversity by shifting focus away from eliminating discrimination against members of certain groups and toward valuing and leveraging all kinds of human differences, including demographic differences, to improve capability and readiness. The Commission believes that institutionalizing this broader concept of diversity will ensure that the U.S. military will develop officers and senior enlisted servicemembers who not only are demographically diverse but also have the background and skills most needed to enhance military performance.

## Approach and Scope

Congress listed 16 specific tasks for the Commission in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 596. After careful review, the Commission grouped these tasks into ten substantive categories. Four were based on the military leadership career life cycle. The remaining categories were designed to cover topics critical to defining and managing diversity, tracking the progress of change, and ensuring that recommendations and affiliated policy changes were made in full accordance with U.S. law. In 2010, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Section 594, expanded the mission of the MLDC to include the National Guard and Reserve Component. Six new Commissioners were added to the MLDC in order to fulfill this new mandate.

The following subcommittees were formed to address the ten substantive categories:

- Definition of Diversity
- Legal Implications
- Outreach and Recruiting
- Leadership and Training
- Branching and Assignments
- Promotion
- Retention
- Implementation and Accountability
- Metrics
- National Guard and Reserve.

These subcommittees acquired pertinent information from the Services, including their definitions of diversity, ongoing initiatives, personnel data, outreach and recruiting strategies, retention efforts, promotion processes, and career development programs. They also received material on diversity management from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

The Commission also gathered information through informational interviews with servicemembers and key stakeholders and through monthly public meetings that featured presentations from military leaders from DoD and each of the Services. Representatives of the diversity offices of OSD and the five Services presented demographic data and briefings on their current policies and practices. The Chairman of the Joint

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Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), and each of the five Service Chiefs spoke to the Commission as well, providing their perspectives on diversity. Additional speakers included the Honorable Claiborne Haughton, Jr., the Honorable Colin Powell, and the Honorable Eric Shinseki. Diversity experts from private industry and academia addressed the Commission and answered questions about their approaches to diversity management. Finally, a panel of male and female combat veterans addressed the Commission on issues surrounding women serving in combat.

With this information, the Commission and its staff conducted extensive investigation into the demographic profile of the Armed Forces today; the ways in which the Services recruit, train, assign, promote, and retain military personnel; the future missions the Armed Forces will likely face; current diversity policies and plans; and diversity best practices in the private sector. During this process, the Commission realized that it needed to give careful consideration to the evolving concept of diversity, which is moving beyond differences in race/ethnicity, religion, and gender to include a broader set of factors needed to create an inclusive workforce.

Based on the information collected, each subcommittee released a series of issue papers providing substantive background unique to the topic. Each subcommittee also developed a decision paper that reports both the subcommittee's main findings and the Commission-approved, topic-specific recommendations that resulted from the Commissioners' understanding and interpretation of the subcommittee's findings.<sup>2</sup> The final step of the process was to develop specific, final recommendations for improving the diversity of military leadership.

## Recommendations

The Commission determined that its final recommendations should serve three inter-related goals:

- Establish the foundation for effective diversity leadership with a definition of diversity that is congruent with DoD's core values and vision of its future.
- Develop future leaders who represent the face of America and are able to effectively lead a diverse workforce to maximize mission effectiveness.
- Implement policies and practices that will make leaders accountable for instilling diversity leadership as a core competency of the Armed Forces.

Each of the final recommendations was also required to meet several criteria defined by the Commission. Each needed to fulfill the Commission's charter, be supported by empirical evidence, be strategic rather than tactical, be feasible for implementation, meet legal requirements, and have a quantifiable intent. Commissioners evaluated recommendations based on how closely they adhered to these criteria. Rec-

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<sup>2</sup> The Legal Implications Subcommittee did not produce a decision paper because the Commission made no recommendations specific to the subcommittee's findings. Rather, those findings served to inform all of the Commission's recommendations.

ommendations that did not meet the criteria were modified or eliminated. If Commissioners in attendance did not approve the recommendations unanimously, the Commission deliberated until a consensus was reached. All final recommendations were approved by the conclusion of the final meeting in December 2010.<sup>3</sup>

Two important topics related to diversity were outside the scope of the Commission's work. First, the Commission did not study the civilian workforce and its top leadership. This omission should not imply, however, that the diversity of the civilian workforce is not important for DoD. On the contrary, a diverse civilian workforce is critical to the 21st-century military because this group is an essential element of the total force. But, because the civilian workforce is managed differently than the military workforce, to fully address the issues and challenges associated with improving the diversity of the civilian workforce requires a separate study.

Second, the Commission did not address issues related to the military service of openly gay men and women. Although the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy certainly pertains to diversity and diversity leadership, a comprehensive examination of the issue was already in progress by the DoD Comprehensive Review Working Group. Two other efforts have addressed that issue in detail.<sup>4</sup>

## Organization of This Report

This report is divided into four sections. Section I, Introduction, introduces this study and, in Chapter Two, defines diversity for DoD. This definition incorporates but goes beyond equal opportunity to include a broader range of diversity factors, with important implications for Armed Forces core values, core competencies, training, and leadership skills.

Section II, Building the Foundation for Change, articulates the Commission's belief that leveraging diversity as a vital strategic military resource will require the commitment, vision, and know-how of all senior leadership. In Chapter Three, the Commission presents its most far-reaching recommendations: those related to ensuring leadership commitment to diversity. Without this commitment to instill respect for diversity as a core value, the needed cultural change may not take place.

Section III, Developing Future Leaders, describes recommendations that focus primarily on increasing racial/ethnic and gender representation within military leadership:

- Chapter Four offers an overview of the demographic composition of current military leadership, documenting that military officers today are less demographically

<sup>3</sup> The recommendations are presented in full in Appendix C.

<sup>4</sup> DoD General Counsel Jeh Johnson and Army General Carter Ham led DoD's comprehensive review of the policy and of how the U.S. military must prepare for and implement any associated changes in the law (see Johnson et al., 2010). In response to congressional tasking, the RAND Corporation recently published an update of its 1993 report on sexual orientation and U.S. military personnel policy (see National Defense Research Institute, 2010).

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diverse than both the enlisted troops they lead and the broader civilian population they serve.

- Chapter Five discusses how eligibility requirements both define the eligible population from which the Services can recruit and affect the demographic profile of eligible recruits.
- Chapter Six describes current outreach and recruiting practices across the Services, reports on the demographic composition of recent accessions, and recommends policies to improve recruiting of racial/ethnic minorities and women.
- Chapter Seven describes how policy changes can remove structural and perceptual barriers that create potential demographic differences in career field preferences and command assignment opportunities—which, in turn, influence the future demographic diversity of senior military leadership.
- Chapter Eight discusses how potential barriers to promotion and resulting demographic differences in promotion rates can affect the future demographic diversity of senior military leadership.
- Chapter Nine examines whether there are demographic differences in who chooses to remain in and who chooses to separate from military service and identifies barriers that may influence demographic differences in retention.
- Chapter Ten describes how the Commission recommends tracking and improving other aspects of diversity within the military.

Section IV, Ensuring Continued Progress, describes how to manage and sustain the changes proposed in the earlier sections. Chapter Eleven proposes recommendations related to developing a stronger organizational structure and a system of accountability, monitoring, and enforcement to ensure continued progress toward greater diversity among all ranks of the military. Chapter Twelve advises that the ultimate impact of the recommendations in this report will depend on the unwavering commitment of the Commander in Chief (the President of the United States) and the resolute conviction of the Secretary of Defense.

## CHAPTER TWO

## DEFINING DIVERSITY FOR A NEW ERA

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The word *diversity* provokes mixed reactions from U.S. citizens. For some—especially those who grew up before and during the civil rights movement—the word conjures up the fight against racial segregation and inequality. For these Americans, diversity policies and programs are another name for equal opportunity (EO) programs, and most notably for affirmative action. But for other Americans, especially the young who have grown up under the protection of laws and regulations that provide equal opportunity for all, diversity means something broader. It goes beyond differences among demographic groups and requires more than affirmative action.

DoD and the Services have developed their own definitions, which vary widely in length and specificity and are not consistent with one another (see Issue Paper #20 and Lim et al., 2008). One of the first tasks the Commission tackled was to develop a uniform definition of diversity that could be used by DoD and the Services. Congress asked the Commission to define diversity in a way that is congruent with the core values of DoD and its vision of the future workforce. The Commission investigated existing definitions with these considerations in mind. DoD's core values are “leadership, professionalism, and technical know-how,” which are upheld through the core values that everyone in uniform must live by: “duty, integrity, ethics, honor, courage, and loyalty” (U.S. Department of Defense, n.d.). Each Service has established its own core values as well, and these too were taken into consideration.

The Commission also examined DoD's vision of its future workforce and the factors that will affect its composition. Research on this subject confirms the importance of embracing a definition of diversity that goes beyond the concept of equal opportunity for all. The future workforce will be made up not only of men and women of different racial/ethnic backgrounds and different religious views but also of people with different talents, work backgrounds, and skill sets.

The Commission recognizes that the Nation is facing enemies who attack in non-traditional ways and must be countered with a wider range of capabilities. The Nation's warfighting forces must be willing and able to benefit from the talent of all individuals who are prepared to offer their unique skills, perspectives, and backgrounds in the service of their country. With this in mind, the Commission developed a new definition of diversity.

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## The Department of Defense Should Adopt a New Definition of Diversity

### *Recommendation 1—*

*DoD shall adopt the following definition: Diversity is all the different characteristics and attributes of individuals that are consistent with Department of Defense core values, integral to overall readiness and mission accomplishment, and reflective of the Nation we serve.*

The definition of diversity recommended by the Commission has evolved from the concept of diversity that has motivated the Services for decades. That concept is associated with equal employment opportunity (EEO) laws, initiatives, and programs that make it illegal to discriminate in the hiring or promotion of an individual on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or other physical-appearance or individual characteristics. These laws were put in place to avoid a continuation of the historic discrimination and mistreatment experienced by certain groups.

After the Vietnam War, which highlighted the great disparities between the percentages of racial minority officers and racial minority enlisted personnel that resulted in racial polarization and harassment, the Services dedicated themselves to the goal of improving the fairness of their personnel practices, including recruitment, career opportunities, and promotion. They turned to civilian EEO laws and applied them to the military sector.<sup>1</sup> They embraced the guiding principle of EO programs, which declared that all individuals will have a chance to pursue the same opportunities and will not be discriminated against or harassed in their pursuit of a career or position

(U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, n.d.). They implemented affirmative action policies that extended beyond EEO laws because these policies entailed actively reaching out to individuals from underrepresented demographic groups or groups that have been historically left out of the organization.

These efforts, sustained over decades, have made the U.S. military a groundbreaking institution that strives to advance the democratic equality of its workforce. The Services have pioneered outreach and

Because of the success of affirmative action in the military, it is easy to forget just how segregated the officer corps once was. In 1968, African-American enrollment at West Point and Annapolis was less than 1 percent; as late as 1973, just 2.8 percent of all military officers were African-American. By contrast, during that period, African-Americans constituted as much as 17 percent of the rank and file. In Vietnam, the consequences of this de facto segregation were devastating.

—Jerome Karabel, “Race and National Security,” 2003

recruiting strategies, management tools, and racial/ethnic minority representation goals arising from EO and affirmative action programs. Military men and women of different racial/ethnic backgrounds have learned to work together as a team to protect the Nation. Individuals expect to be promoted not on the basis of their background

<sup>1</sup> Military equal opportunity regulations are separate from EEO. The latter is the suite of laws and regulations that apply to the civilian workforce.

or heritage but on the basis of the Services' standards of excellence and performance. Building on this foundation, the Commission's concept of diversity incorporates these goals and adds others.

## Moving Forward: From Representation to Inclusion

The new definition of diversity is based on a model of diversity management that incorporates the best ideals of EO and affirmative action with the practice of casting a wide net to recruit, train, foster, and promote people with a diversity of characteristics and attributes that can benefit the Services. The new definition aims to give all service-members equal treatment at every step in their military careers, but it also goes further: The words "all the different characteristics and attributes of individuals" in the definition refer not only to characteristics and attributes legally protected by EO laws but to *any and all* characteristics and attributes that can benefit the Services, including thinking style, occupational background, and skill sets. In other words, diversity, as understood by the Commission, includes characteristics and attributes both included and not included in EO law; this is because *any* type of difference can affect mission effectiveness.

The Commission has heard concerns that defining diversity broadly in this manner will turn attention away from historically underrepresented demographic groups in military leadership positions. In other words, some critics believe that to define diversity in a way that goes beyond race/ethnicity and gender is to define away the very real challenges that specific groups still face.

The Commission recognizes this concern but believes that establishing a broad understanding of diversity throughout DoD will not harm the representation of these populations. In fact, understanding diversity more broadly can help to build the representation of these populations in military leadership because these populations have always offered the skills and talents that military leadership requires.


Furthermore, the broad definition of diversity reflects the realities faced by today's military. Just as changes in the demographic mix of the Nation's population are increasing the demographic diversity of new accessions, changes in the budgetary and conflict environments are calling for new skills, more integration across military components, better coordination with other government agencies, and smoother cooperation with global partners.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the progression from the EO model of diversity used in the past to the broader concept of inclusion proposed for the future. EO relies on compliance with regulations to eliminate discrimination; the concept of diversity as inclusion

[S]ome of these [diversity] consultants ... would encourage you to sweep these directives on EO and EEO under the rug in the hope that they will go away and yes, they will simply want you to take down the sign off the EEO and the EO director's door and replace it with a sign that says "Director for Managing Diversity," but you can't manage diversity if you haven't first achieved diversity. So I stopped by here to tell you that if you think that you can manage diversity without first achieving diversity, in the words of Malcolm X, you have been had, took, bamboozled, and hoodwinked.

—The Honorable Claiborne Haughton, Jr.,  
remarks to the Commission, 2010

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**Figure 2.1. 21st-Century Inclusion Builds on the Foundation of 20th-Century Representation**

SOURCE: Adapted from Defense Business Board Task Group on Increasing Diversity in DoD's Flag and Senior Executive Ranks, 2004.

values individual differences *because they are critical to the new approaches and practices needed for a successful fighting force*. This concept is consistent with EO policies and practices because it is based on the fair and equitable treatment of all personnel, regardless of their membership in a protected class.

## America's Growing Diversity: A Resource for Leadership

It is critical for DoD leaders to understand that, by all accounts, *the racial/ethnic and cultural makeup of the United States is changing*. Current projections from the U.S. Census Bureau (n.d.) suggest that the proportion of racial/ethnic minority youth will increase in this century and that the proportion of non-Hispanic white youth will decline. If the Services wish to stay strong in numbers, they must attract more individuals from traditional racial/ethnic minority groups. Current military leadership undoubtedly recognizes the need to ensure the continuous replacement of departing servicemembers, especially during times of crisis or threat of crisis. A military stretched thin by a lack of new members and aspiring leaders can pose a serious threat to national security.

The Commission believes strongly that the Services need to develop and promote military leaders who reflect the forces they lead. It has always been in the best interest of the military to recruit and retain leaders who are representative of the many faces

of America.<sup>2</sup> Today's multiracial, multiethnic, and multicultural force is a living testament to the richly diverse population of the Nation it serves. Current Service leadership, however, does not reflect the demographics of those it leads or serves.

The Commission believes that leadership positions held by men and women from the many race/ethnicity groups that make up the United States have the potential to instill pride among the populations they represent and to secure greater trust in military leadership. A demographically representative leadership can also encourage servicemembers from underrepresented groups to aspire to leadership roles themselves, or they can inspire youth from different backgrounds to become interested in military service. One need only remember the popular perceptions of racial/ethnic minorities serving as "cannon fodder" for white military leaders in Vietnam to understand how important ethnic, racial, and gender representation is to the psychological well-being and reputation of the U.S. military (Becton et al., 2003). Perceptions of a noninclusive military leadership can estrange the military from the people it represents and from which it ultimately draws its strength.

Just as our military looks like America, so too must our general officers.

—Rep. James E. Clyburn (D-SC),  
press release, 2008

The truest melting pot in our society exists aboard aircraft carriers, in barracks, and on bases. Mess halls and exchange service stores, shooting ranges and training facilities are portraits of diversity. But in the officers' clubs, a much different picture emerges.

—Rep. Kendrick B. Meek (D-FL),  
press release, 2008

Leadership is what we need, because I believe that when someone who is attracted to the Navy ... looks up that chain of command, they have to see themselves. If they can't see themselves, they won't believe.

—Admiral Gary Roughead, remarks  
to the Commission, 2010

## Diversity as a Force Multiplier

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has faced an increasingly wide range of threats. The gap between conventional and unconventional warfare continues to widen. The 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* communicates DoD's commitment "to ensure that tomorrow's leaders are prepared for the difficult missions they will be asked to execute" by placing "special emphasis on stability operations, counterinsurgency, and building partner capacity skill sets in its professional military education and career development policies" (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). DoD's newly formed vision of its requirements implicitly suggests that greater diversity should be developed within and across the total defense workforce. Instead of relying on outdated strategies, the Armed Forces must expand military skill sets and

<sup>2</sup> The issue of representation in the military has existed as long as the Nation and represents "the legitimate concerns of the populace" about the motives and allegiances of its Armed Forces: "In a democracy, it is believed that a broadly representative military force is more likely to uphold national values and to be loyal to the government—and country—that raised it" (Armor, 1996).

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train the force so that the right people with the right capabilities and backgrounds are brought to the fight when they are needed.

New challenges have made an emphasis on total force integration more critical than ever before, and DoD is facilitating a greater number of joint, coalition, and interagency collaborations that will allow threats to be analyzed and addressed from multiple points of view using multiple areas of expertise. Joint operations are a large-scale, military example of the strength that comes with diversity. The goal of joint operations is to bring together the Services' unique strengths and capabilities to maximize the odds of military success. Each Service has its own "personality"—traditions, culture, and modes of training, operating, and fighting. Joint operations do not level or eliminate each Service's unique traditions and capabilities but instead work toward seamlessly integrated tactical coordination and strategic direction. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard servicemembers are not outfitted with just one uniform or taught to employ one single way of fighting: Each Service maintains its culture, heritage, and ways of engaging in

We are going to be operating in diverse cultures, and having a diverse squad or a platoon gives you a lot of different views to deal with diverse culture and the complexities that they are going to be confronting. It's absolutely a combat multiplier, especially in the environments that we see coming at us and that we are dealing with today.

—General George W. Casey, Jr.,  
remarks to the Commission, 2010

battle and peacekeeping missions. Joint operations have demonstrated that the inclusion of differences can enhance situational awareness, agility, and responsiveness to current and emergent threats. Integrating the Services' differences into a single coordinated force is difficult, and the Armed Forces have spent considerable time and treasure making it possible.

The Commission similarly recognizes that individuals come to the military not only with different cultural, racial/ethnic, and religious backgrounds but also with myriad skill sets, talents, education levels, and work experience. The Commission believes that all of these characteristics and attributes, if properly managed, can help the Services reap optimum results from their most valuable resource: their people.

In the new model of diversity and diversity management put forth by the Commission, there are four dimensions of characteristics that can assist in meeting new missions:

1. *Demographic diversity* refers to immutable differences among individuals, such as race/ethnicity, gender, and age, as well as to differences in personal background, such as religion, education level, and marital status.
2. *Cognitive diversity* refers to different personality types, such as extroverted/introverted, and to different thinking styles, such as quick and decisive versus slow and methodical.
3. *Structural diversity* refers to organizational background differences, including Service, occupation, component (i.e., Active or Reserve), and work function.
4. *Global diversity* occurs through contact with those (e.g., members of foreign military services) who have national affiliations with countries other than the United States (Lim et al., 2008; Riche et al., 2007).

Although *demographic diversity* alone is not enough to meet the challenges that lie ahead, it is a critical component of overall diversity. Including a broad range of men and women from different backgrounds can increase the likelihood that the U.S. military “knows the enemy” and is better able to work with international partners by adding to the cultural and linguistic knowledge base from which U.S. forces may draw. Actively seeking demographic diversity also ensures that no talented individual will be “left behind” as a result of prejudice or discrimination. Engendering greater demographic diversity in both the rank and file and among leadership will result in a military that is representative of the citizenry it serves.

*Cognitive diversity* ensures that the military will be able to fill both traditional and novel positions. Different skill sets, personalities, and thinking styles are needed to manage, strategize, equip, fight, operate, repair, and otherwise engage in any of the hundreds of functions that the Services perform daily (Issue Paper #4; Kraus et al., 2007).

*Structural diversity* provides the expertise of servicemembers affiliated with particular occupations, Services, or components. It also enables needed capabilities to be brought to the table and fully incorporated into the mix. Exchanging information and perspectives across different branches or occupations can result in innovative ways of confronting the threat.

*Global diversity* is an inevitable part of today’s missions. Both warfighting and peacekeeping are increasingly being done in cooperation with global coalition partners.

## Diversity Management: An Institutional Priority

Many nonmilitary organizations recognize that diversity can provide a competitive edge if it is developed and managed properly. The Commission reviewed relevant management literature and a number of diversity goals from successful businesses. These emphasize the importance of developing and utilizing the diversity of workforces in ways that improve outcomes, such as generating a larger customer base, boosting revenue, and improving cost-effectiveness. This set of organizational goals is usually referred to as the *business case for diversity*. The corporate diversity statements generally share two broad themes:

- Diversity, broadly defined, creates performance advantages through the synergy of people’s different ideas and competencies.
- Good diversity management entails recognizing, appreciating, respecting, and utilizing a variety of human attributes, not just race/ethnicity.

Evidence suggests there is not a strong business case for diversity *per se*, but, given that demographic diversity is already here, pervasive, and growing, demographic business-case arguments stress the importance of managing diversity to achieve desired organizational and business outcomes (Issue Paper #14). The evidence also suggests that organizations may be able to mitigate diversity’s potential costs: Diversity must be

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managed, diversity management tools must be provided, and there must be agreement that the benefits are worth the investment (Issue Paper #29).

DoD and the Services are also interested in improving performance through diversity, but their desired outcomes differ from those of nonmilitary organizations. These different objectives include increasing regional and cultural capabilities, better coordinating military and civilian capabilities, more seamlessly integrating the National Guard and Reserve with the full-time, active-duty forces, and developing a broader inventory of specialized skills (such as foreign languages, medicine, and computer network operations).

The new definition of diversity and the focus on diversity management necessarily have profound implications for the way the military conducts big-picture and day-to-day personnel management. Therefore, the Commission suggests that DoD accompany the release of the recommended definition—or indeed any new definition—with a mission statement that prioritizes equity and inclusion and provides a purpose that is actionable, measurable, and accompanied by a concept of operations to advance implementation. As with any mission objective, diversity will require a clear presentation of goals, strategies, and tactics, as well as recommended processes for initiating and maintaining implementation to move closer toward success.

Diversity management calls for creating a culture of inclusion in which the diversity of knowledge and perspectives that members of different groups bring to the organization shapes how the work is done (see Holvino et al., 2004). Creating this culture will involve changing the way in which people relate to one another within a single unit, within a particular military branch, and throughout DoD. In particular, although good diversity management rests on a foundation of fair treatment, it is not about treating everyone the same. This can be a difficult concept to grasp, especially for leaders who grew up with the EO-inspired mandate to be both color and gender blind.

And diversity in the Navy, diversity at home, makes us better, when we as a Navy are operating in support of our country's interests, because I really do believe the motivator for me when it comes to diversity is [that] diversity gives us better solutions. Diversity makes us stronger. It makes us more effective because we are able to draw from many different perspectives, and that is the power of diversity.

—Admiral Gary Roughead, remarks to the Commission, 2010

Blindness to difference, however, can lead to a culture of assimilation in which differences are suppressed rather than leveraged (see Thomas & Ely, 1996).

Cultural assimilation, a key to military effectiveness in the past, will be challenged as inclusion becomes, and needs to become, the norm. Traditional basic training, for example, is focused on assimilating individuals into a fighting force tied together by the adoption of similar terminology, customs, and attitudes.

However, current military operations are executed within more-complex, uncertain, and rapidly changing operational environments that defy the warfighting standards of the past and that need to be met with an adaptive and agile leadership that is ready to respond more flexibly and with a greater propensity for creative strategizing.

The need to leverage diversity while maintaining unit cohesion will require implementing new training and procedures and addressing new tensions—important elements of diversity management described later in this report.

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**SECTION II:**  
**BUILDING THE FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE**

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## CHAPTER THREE

# ENSURING LEADERSHIP COMMITMENT TO DIVERSITY

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Leveraging diversity as a vital strategic military resource will require the commitment, vision, and know-how of leadership, as well as an organizational plan for achieving the desired outcomes. Two different but related paths will need to be taken. One involves following through on EO principles and practices. The Commission's recommendations in this area will help the Armed Forces systematically develop a demographically diverse leadership that reflects the forces it leads. The second path involves the new, broader understanding of diversity, which includes yet goes beyond demographics. Many of the Commission's recommendations are related to both of these aspects of diversity.

This chapter addresses what the Commission believes are its most far-reaching recommendations. They are the needed changes that will most securely set DoD and the Services on a path toward reaping the benefits of diversity.

## Diversity Leadership Must Become a Core Competency

### *Recommendation 2—*

*To enhance readiness and mission accomplishment, effectively leading diverse groups must become a core competency across DoD and the Services. To implement this recommendation,*

- *a. Leadership training at all levels shall include education in diversity dynamics and training in practices for leading diverse groups effectively.*
- *b. DoD and the Services should determine the framework (e.g., curriculum, content, methods) for how to inculcate such education and training into leader development, including how to measure and evaluate its effectiveness.*

Both the Commissioners and guest speakers from corporate and military backgrounds believe that diversity has the potential to increase mission capability. However, to be effective, members of a broadly diverse unit or the entire force must be led in ways that value and include their differences while minimizing any negative influence that differences can have. Effective practices for leading a diverse group, referred to here as *diversity leadership*, address how leaders at all ranks and organizational levels shape the effect that diversity has on the forces under their command. *Diversity lead-*

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*ership* thus refers to how leaders influence the ways in which people and groups under their command relate to one another.

The Commission strongly believes that diversity leadership must become a core competency at all levels of the Armed Forces. Diversity leadership is both a fundamental way of thinking and a set of skills at which all military leaders must excel in order to get the best performance possible from the servicemembers they lead every day. Diversity leadership can be inculcated by focusing on two strategies.

### **Leadership Training at All Levels Shall Include Education in Diversity Dynamics and Training**

The Commission identified a number of effective practices for leading diverse workgroups that can help the Services benefit from diversity and avoid some of the potential pitfalls (see Issue Paper #29). Studies suggest that effective diversity leadership begins with a leader looking through a “diversity lens” to identify and understand the diversity dynamics that are relevant in his or her command. Doing this requires the leader to

- recognize the “differences” that exist within the group
- both understand the dynamics that can cause those differences to have negative effects (e.g., loss of cohesion, communications difficulties, conflict) and create opportunities for those differences to have a positive effect on organizational performance
- apply leadership practices that can neutralize the potential negative effects and, if possible, leverage differences in support of the mission.

Diversity leadership involves applying practices that management professionals have long identified as successful personnel management techniques but that take on new significance for leaders of diverse workgroups. This is because leaders are responsible for the way group members communicate, cooperate, trust one another, and remain cohesive as a group.<sup>1</sup> Absent effective leadership, such as the leader focusing the group on the overarching mission, this fundamental and powerful human process can create in-groups and out-groups within a given work unit or organization. These dynamics can strongly affect the on-the-ground functioning of a diverse group in a planning room or in a war zone and at the platoon level or for the commander of a joint force. Facilitating strong communication, cooperation, trust, and cohesion can be challenging for leaders.

The Commission emphasizes education as part of the recommendation pertaining to diversity leadership. Developing leaders to lead diverse groups effectively goes beyond training them to understand diversity: It requires educating them about the

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<sup>1</sup> These elements are in play because the fundamental mechanism through which diversity affects capability is social identity and social categorization (see, for example, Jackson et al., 2003; Tsui & Gutek, 1999; and Tsui et al., 1992). People attach meaning to their memberships in identity groups, such as demographic or occupational groups, and these identity groups then shape behaviors and perceptions in different settings (see, for example, Mor Barak et al., 1998).

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dynamics that diversity creates in workgroups and then training them in practices that can neutralize the negative dynamics and maximize their positive potential.

***Diversity Leadership Education and Training Are Not the Same as Diversity Training***

A training assessment performed by the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, Directorate of Research (2008), found that diversity training within each Service addresses respect for demographic differences. Current diversity training does not, however, teach leaders to utilize differences to improve mission effectiveness. Briefings from DoD and Service representatives to the Commission indicate that the Services are generally not instilling these practices in their leadership paradigms and that they are not teaching them. However, Service representatives indicated that each Service does teach practices that can be effective for leading both diverse and homogeneous teams.

The Commission stresses that diversity leadership training must be offered *at all levels* because it is leaders who are in direct contact with the workgroups that can make a difference in capability. The key term here is *workgroup* because it is in these groups that day-to-day interactions among different people take place. In other words, the Commission views diversity leadership practices as the things that all leaders do every day, not what others (e.g., EO advisors, diversity officers) may do on their behalf.

***DoD and the Services Need a Framework for Implementation and Assessment of Leader Development***

The Commission, which found no DoD or Service syllabus that addresses diversity leadership, believes it is important to ensure that DoD develop an overall framework within which the Services can develop their own leadership training.

The Commission acknowledges the large training burden already placed on the Services. As one Commissioner said, “The last thing we want is another training requirement, but we need to shift from an EO to a diversity framework.” The framework will both allow the Services to develop their own education and training modules and ensure that they address the same goal: creating a core competency at each level of leadership for leveraging diversity in the service of mission capability. In other words, the Commission is not proposing a new program but rather new modules for the Services to incorporate in their existing leadership programs.

Finally, the Commission recommends that once the curriculum, content, and methods are developed and implemented, they be evaluated. The Commission found no indication that the Services have thus far evaluated the effectiveness of either their leadership training or their diversity training. It did, however, hear about research showing that much of corporate sector diversity training is not effective for achieving the corporate goal of greater racial/ethnic minority and female representation in senior leadership positions (Dobbin, 2010; Kalev et al., 2006). Thus, evaluation is a serious concern and must be addressed in order for diversity leadership to become a true core competency.

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## Leadership Must Be Personally Committed to Diversity

### *Recommendation 3—*

*The leadership of DoD and the Services must personally commit to making diversity an institutional priority.*

Successful change in an organization depends on committed leadership. This is as true for the Services as for nonmilitary organizations. The Commission reviewed statements by chief executive officers (CEOs) and diversity professionals from a number of leading corporations and also examined statements by military leaders already committed to developing diversity. Time and again, it was stressed in documents and presentations that *leadership must personally and visibly lead a diversity effort in order to bring about meaningful and lasting change.*

Organizational change is a top-down process, and creating a powerful coalition of leaders to manage and maintain the change process is a critical component of success. Persons in top leadership positions are the ultimate drivers of change because they have both the authority to initiate new methods of operation and the final responsibility for ensuring the methods' success. The leaders responsible for driving a diversity

paradigm shift throughout DoD and the Services include the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, members of Congress, and leaders from each of the Services. Each of these leaders must authorize change and oversee the success of military diversity management programs and initiatives. Together, active top leaders can develop, implement, and maintain change by constantly reinforcing one another (see Issue Paper #21).

It is important to remember how critical strong leadership is to servicemembers' performance and morale. When change comes into view, there can be strong resistance. Changes that address people's racial/ethnic, religious, and other differences can prove to be especially challenging because these topics can be emotionally charged for many people.

A model of diversity leadership from the top is Admiral Gary Roughead, the current Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Alone among the Service Chiefs, Admiral Roughead, in his diversity policy statement,

The first and most effective thing in any organization's desire to manage diversity is clear-cut support from the senior leader.

—Luke Visconti, remarks to the Commission, 2010

Senior leadership commitment in both word and action was the most commonly cited key to success mentioned in the Task Group's best-practices interviews. Interviewees were adamant that the Chief Executive Officer's (CEO's) leadership must be visible to the whole organization, that it must be plain-spoken, clear, convincing, frequent and supported by action. The CEO must incorporate this commitment into the corporate strategy, culture and values.

—Defense Business Board Task Group on Increasing Diversity in DoD's Flag and Senior Executive Ranks, 2004

Part of getting there . . . is if your senior leadership declares [diversity] as key to its success and the key leaders—the top leaders—are actively, not passively, but actively managing the process.

—Michael Montelongo, remarks to the Commission, 2010

states clearly and unequivocally that he will lead diversity initiatives: “As the Chief of Naval Operations, I will lead diversity initiatives in the Navy. I challenge all who serve to do the same through leadership, mentorship, service, and example” (Chief of Naval Operations, 2008). He and his predecessor as CNO, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, spoke to the Commission movingly and personally of their commitment to diversity (see Mullen, 2009, and Roughead, 2010).

## Diversity Needs to Become an Integral Part of DoD Culture

### *Recommendation 4—*

*DoD and the Services should inculcate into their organizational cultures a broader understanding of the various types of diversity by*


- *a. Making respect for diversity a core value.*
- *b. Identifying and rewarding the skills needed to meet the operational challenges of the 21st century.*
- *c. Using strategic communications plans to communicate their diversity vision and values.*

Deep changes, like those called for in the Commission’s recommendations, cannot be instituted with the push of a button. If DoD is to institutionalize the new definition of diversity so that all servicemembers understand its meaning and importance and act accordingly, leading diversity to enhance mission effectiveness must become inherent in military culture.

All personnel must be aligned with diversity objectives in order to truly reap the benefits of diversity. Making diversity and diversity leadership top priorities may call for individuals to step beyond their comfort zones from time to time. For example, if a leader is faced with a choice between two very different individuals of equal qualifications, he or she must be ready to choose the person who best enhances the effectiveness of the work unit, knowing that diversity has the potential to improve the work of that unit. This “difference” could relate to race/ethnicity, gender, or religion, but it could also relate to educational background, specialty, or international experience. Although this is one example of a decision, it is important to remember that increasing the diversity of DoD and each Service requires thousands of decision-makers in similar situations to go beyond the comfort and familiarity of old ways of thinking.

To inform its recommendation for effectively introducing and implementing the new understanding of diversity throughout DoD, the Commission reviewed management literature and found that the leaders who were most effective in undertaking fundamental change followed some variation of the model presented in Figure 3.1 (see Issue Paper #21). Leaders understand that, to last, change must be introduced by “unfreezing” old attitudes and behaviors, implemented through forward movement, and then sustained by “refreezing” new behaviors and attitudes.

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**Figure 3.1. Best Practices for Managing Change**

The eight steps presented in Figure 3.1 may help leadership institute the changes necessary to inculcate diversity into Service cultures while, at the same time, reducing resistance to those changes. Notably, this is not a quick-fix method; rather, it is a continuous process to improve the staying power of new programs and policies by developing servicemember commitment through planning and communication from the top down. It is critical that each leader subscribe to the same clear vision of diversity because these leaders will be communicating the vision to all of the organization's members. It is also important that the vision of diversity include the entire workforce. Leadership should express why the future state is better than the current state, explain how DoD and the Services will arrive at the future state, and inspire all members to reach new goals.

To carry out this recommendation, the Commission recommends three key strategies.

### **All Members of DoD and the Services Must Understand Respect for Diversity as a Core Military Value**

Core values are unchanging foundational principles that guide how people in an organization conduct their everyday business. An organization's core values do not require external justification. They are the internal structure that informs the way members interact with one another, and they guide the strategies that the organization employs to fulfill its mission. Ultimately, core values motivate how the organization works and give a shared identity to the people belonging to it.

In 1969, DoD issued the first DoD Human Goals Charter,<sup>2</sup> which explicitly and publicly recognized respect for diversity as a value integral to the DoD identity (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1995). From 1969 through 1998, evolving versions of the charter were signed by every incoming Secretary of Defense and by the leadership of the military departments and Services.<sup>3</sup> Excerpts of the 1998 Human Goals Charter, which is reprinted in full in Figure 3.2, follow:

In all that we do, we must show respect for the serviceman, the servicewoman, the civilian employee, and family members, recognizing their individual needs, aspirations, and capabilities. . . . We [must] strive: . . .

TO provide opportunity for everyone, military and civilian, to rise to as high a level of responsibility as possible, dependent only on individual talent and diligence;


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<sup>2</sup> The charter was ahead of its time in making the following statement of goals for the civilian workforce: "TO provide equity in civilian employment regardless of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, or sexual orientation, and to provide an environment that is accessible to and usable by all."

<sup>3</sup> DoDD 1440.1, *The DoD Civilian Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Program*, mandates that DoD "prepare a new DoD Human Goals Charter each time a new Secretary of Defense is appointed" (U.S. Department of Defense, 1987). However, the last charter was signed in 1998 by then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen. The charter was not renewed by the George W. Bush administration and, as of January 2011, had not been renewed by the Obama administration.

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Figure 3.2. The 1998 DoD Human Goals Charter



July 24, 1998

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TO assure that equal opportunity programs are an integral part of readiness;  
TO make military service in the Department of Defense a model of equal opportunity for all regardless of race, color, sex, religion or national origin; . . .  
TO create an environment that values diversity and fosters mutual respect and cooperation among all persons[.]

A process was followed that helped the charter became part of DoD's culture. The Honorable Claiborne Haughton, Jr., recalled the procedure when he addressed the Commission at its March 2010 meeting:

[The charter] must go out to all of the major elements of the Department of Defense and be coordinated and get their concurrence. . . . [T]he signatories are the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs, and the DoD general counsel. Those are all the top leaders . . . and they must sign on to that charter before we can present it to the Secretary of Defense for signature, and so it is done that way each time that the new charter has been prepared and issued. And the wonderful thing about it is then we are authorized to make . . . a huge Styrofoam copy or a printed copy, a small copy, and you send them all over, and so when you walk into federal agencies you will see where they have maybe a picture of the President or the agency chief on the wall when you first walk in, well then, most of the DoD [offices] back in that period, they would get the charter. It's [in the] EEO office and the commander's office, different places like that, so they are clear that this is the policy and practice of the Department of Defense, and what I really love about it is it allows new political executives and new military leaders . . . to get a briefing on why should they sign that charter. They are briefed on what it is. They know what they are signing up to and they get a clear statement of the vision upfront. (Haughton, 2010)

However, the charter has not been renewed since 1998. The Commission believes that renewing the charter is an important statement for leadership to make. Of course, much more action will be required than simply reissuing the charter. For change to take root, appreciation and respect for diversity need to become an integral part of what it means to be a U.S. servicemember, and a strategic approach is required. Exposure to core values begins with recruitment, is forged during boot camp and officer induction training, and reinforced throughout a career, both in professional military education and in the unit. The Services must take this new core value on board and inculcate it into each of their cultures throughout the servicemember life cycle.

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## **Skills Critical to 21st-Century Mission Success Need to Be Identified and Rewarded**

Military operations are changing, and the mix of skills required of the Armed Forces is also in flux. The Commission believes that future leadership in the officer corps will require a wider range of competencies to be effective in the future operational environment. This assumption is supported by changes that have already occurred since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and by forecasts of needed competencies made in such reports as the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. The Commission's research found that 21st-century military leaders will need

- the ability to work collaboratively in interagency environments, with different governments, and in nation-building activities
- keen decision-making skills, since leaders will need to address complex and uncertain emergent threats in 21st-century operational environments
- additional knowledge of foreign languages, regional expertise, and cultural skills
- technological skills, since U.S. military and civilian cyber systems are becoming more complex to defend and utilize.<sup>4</sup>

The Commission recognizes that DoD must also contend with its longstanding concerns that the Armed Forces may not possess enough people with the skills necessary for stability operations. Foreign-area officers, enlisted regional specialists, civil affairs personnel, military police, engineers, and psychological operations personnel are all professionals whose skills are needed for military success and who yet may be insufficiently represented in the personnel pipeline and sparsely represented among senior leadership.

Many needed skills may best be acquired through incorporating reservists, civilians, and contractors more closely into the total force. As demonstrated by the crucial role played by the National Guard and Reserve in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, DoD is already addressing structural diversity through its work in total force integration. The total force can provide skills that are in high demand but in short supply in the Active Component. Computer skills, language proficiency, civil affairs knowledge, and other relevant expertise are likely available in the civilian skill sets possessed by reservists. Efforts are also ongoing to incorporate government employees from a range of agencies into overseas operations.

To attract and retain the range of talent they need, the Services may need to broaden their conception of who belongs in the military and what it takes to be a member of the Armed Forces. Instead of total reliance on "growing their own," the Services may want to explore lateral entry, bringing into active duty older people who already possess the experience and expertise that would be difficult, costly, and time-consuming to create from scratch. A wider range of requirements will call for more types of people. For example, can the operator of a remotely piloted vehicle do his or

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<sup>4</sup> See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, 2010.

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her job from a wheelchair? To compete with the private sector, does the military need to adapt to the ethos of the “computer nerd”?

A broader range of expertise is needed not just at the deckplate but also in the wardroom and at the highest levels of the military hierarchy. The current composition of senior leadership is heavily weighted toward tactical/operational occupations (i.e., warfare specialties). Officers in these specialties, such as infantry (Army and Marine Corps), fighter pilot (Air Force and Navy), and surface warfare (Navy), have been recognized and rewarded because they possess the historical core competencies of their Services. An impartial observer may wonder, however, whether the skills that are valued match up with the competencies currently in highest demand. This is not merely a matter of providing opportunities to traditionally undervalued specialties. It becomes mission critical if needed expertise is not present at councils of war or at meetings of 4-star leaders—the venues in which the Services make decisions about their strategic direction.

The bottom line is that changing operational requirements requires new expertise to be sought out, developed, and integrated into both the workforce and the leadership. How do the Services implement this recommendation? How do they indicate that they value important new skills? At the June 2010 Commission meeting, Admiral Roughead recommended looking at promotion board precepts (the guidance provided to promotion boards). He indicated that he has revised the Navy’s precepts to reflect changing needs, with visible results in the mix of skill sets among its 1-star officers. He suggested that the way to shape the force for tomorrow is to change the precepts today (Roughead, 2010).

### **Use Strategic Communications Plans to Communicate Diversity Vision and Values**

Leaders need to recognize that some servicemembers may react negatively if they feel that diversity management initiatives and programs are basically a repackaging of EO initiatives that will benefit some and not others. Other servicemembers may simply think things are fine the way they are and wonder why there is a need for the changes that a paradigm shift will undoubtedly elicit. Most troubling, research shows that, if it is not managed effectively, diversity—whether defined in traditional demographic terms or more broadly—can actually *reduce* workforce capability (Thompson & Gooler, 1996; Tsui & Gutek, 1999). This failure occurs most frequently because of decreased communication, the increased conflict that can result when some people are (or feel) excluded, or both. Thus, it is the leaders’ responsibility to communicate the new vision and values and why they matter.

One of the first steps toward establishing the new diversity paradigm as part and parcel of DoD culture is to plan and execute a high-profile communication effort explaining the values and vision behind these policies. The change management literature suggests that successful introduction and maintenance of a new institutional culture requires multiple, interconnected exposures to core values (see Issue Paper #21). Any one such communicative effort—a poster, a briefing, a leader’s orders—alone is

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unlikely to have much effect. A thoughtful communications plan that ensures delivery of consistent messages from leaders at all levels is vital for successful cultural change.

The communications plan should have consistent internal and external components that explain the importance to the Armed Forces of diversity, inclusion, and diversity leadership. All communications engendered under the plan should explicitly address how diversity is critical to military success. Finally, the individual servicemember should be able to understand the expectations and implications of the new vision for his or her behavior.

## Congress Needs to Take Action to Ensure Sustained Progress in Diversity

### *Recommendation 5—*

*Congress should revise Title 10, Section 113, to*

- *a. Require the Office of the Secretary of Defense to develop a standard set of strategic metrics and benchmarks to track progress toward the goal of having a dynamic and sustainable 20–30-year pipeline that yields (1) an officer and enlisted corps that reflects the eligible U.S. population across all Service communities and ranks and (2) a military force that is able to prevail in its wars, prevent and deter conflict, defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force.*
- *b. Add diversity annual reports to the list of topics on which the Secretary of Defense reports to Congress and the President. Similar provisions should be added to Title 14 for Coast Guard reporting and to Title 32 for National Guard reporting.*
- *c. Require the Secretary of Defense to meet at least annually with Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs, and senior enlisted leaders to drive progress toward diversity management goals.*

Commitment to change is expressed fully by national leaders when new goals and values are made into law. Title 10, Section 113, requires that the Secretary of Defense report to Congress annually on a number of important topics concerning the operations and activities of DoD. These reports include information on the work, accomplishments, expenditures, and savings of the Armed Forces; the justification for projected military missions and force structure; and an account of the military and civilian personnel assigned to support positions in the past five fiscal years (FYs). The Commission found that the law does not require any reports that could help drive diversity management initiatives further across DoD. Many of the Services are performing assessments and reporting internally on diversity, but these efforts are focused on demographic diversity only and are not sufficiently consistent in terms of what they measure or how they measure it to allow for DoD-wide assessments.

The Commission wishes to stress that producing a 400-page report that presents undigested diversity-related data is *not* the intention of this recommendation. Any

report elicited by new diversity initiatives must ultimately drive improvement. Thus, reporting should focus on a key set of strategic metrics linked to the end state and include analysis and action items.

The Commission proposes the three key changes to reporting requirements.

### **The Office of the Secretary of Defense Should Develop a Standard Set of Strategic Metrics and Benchmarks**

The Commission recommends that Congress direct OSD to develop meaningful metrics that are clearly tied to its diversity goals. These metrics, focused at the strategic level, will not only give Congress and the President the ability to track DoD's progress: They will also improve the Secretary of Defense's understanding of where DoD and the Services stand in achieving their goals.

Diversity managers of major companies stressed to the Commission that strategic metrics must be driven from the top—the CEO level—and that there must be an accountability structure supporting the metrics. Simply put, collecting data without an idea of how to use them will not result in improvement. To drive improvement, the data must be linked to organizational goals, be demanded by leadership, and form the basis of an accountability structure.

The Commission found that the Services are at various stages in their work on diversity and have taken a variety of approaches. Although many of the Services are doing substantial work in this area, the work is primarily personality driven and is not institutionalized.<sup>5</sup> By developing DoD-wide metrics, OSD will facilitate the Services' work with their respective diversity initiatives and align each Service with DoD-wide goals. (Chapter Eleven's discussion of Recommendation 16 covers metrics in more detail as part of policy development and enforcement.)

The metrics and benchmarks that the Commission is calling for are those that support the understanding that the new diversity paradigm is a response both to U.S. demographic shifts and to the challenging mission environment. These metrics and benchmarks should be designed in a way that enables the Secretary of Defense to track progress toward the goal of having a dynamic and sustainable 20–30-year pipeline of individuals who represent the U.S. population and who have the diverse backgrounds and skills needed to face the challenges of the coming years.

### **Assessment Should Result in Service and National Guard Annual Reports to Congress and the President, Authorized by Corresponding Laws**

Reporting is one of the most powerful methods of communication available to the President, Congress, and military leadership needing to oversee and review the imple-

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<sup>5</sup> See, for example, the difference between the perspectives of CNO Admiral Roughead on the one hand and former Commandant of the Marine Corps General James T. Conway on the other (see Conway, 2010, and Roughead, 2010). These different personal perspectives translated into major policy and practice differences between the Navy and the Marine Corps. When questioned about why the Navy had a string of three CNOs who were out front on demographic diversity, Admiral Roughead (2010) said it was because one CNO had influence over who was picked to be the next CNO.

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mentation of DoD policy. DoD- and Service-wide performance reports can ensure that the right information is put into the hands of the right decision-makers at the right time.

As previously stated, the Commission recommends that Congress revise Title 10, Section 113, to require that the Secretary of Defense report annually on progress toward diversity goals. It follows that similar provisions be made in Title 14, for the Coast Guard (which is part of DHS, not DoD), and in Title 32, for the National Guard.

As codified in Title 10, the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, including the National Guard and Reserve when called to active duty. However, most of the time, the National Guard is not on active duty and, therefore, not under federal control.

Title 32 assigns command of State National Guard units to the Governor of the State; each Governor is the commander in chief of his or her State National Guard when it is not under federal control.<sup>6</sup> As commanders in chief, the Governors select the Adjutant Generals for their States.

The Commission recommends that Congress include the National Guard in its reporting requirements. This would mean revising Title 32 in a way that would require the National Guard Bureau to report annually to Congress and DoD on the status of progress toward its diversity management goals. This should include, but not be limited to, reporting on the extent to which each State's National Guard, including its leadership, is representative of that State's general population, relevant labor pool, and eligible population. The report should cover all ranks of the Army and Air National Guard in each State, territory, and the District of Columbia. Requiring these reports will ensure a persistent focus on diversity issues and place accountability at the State level.

### **Regular Meetings Between the Secretary of Defense, Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs, and Senior Enlisted Leaders Should Be Held to Drive Progress**

Like reports, meetings can drive collective progress toward goals. The Commission recommends that Congress require that the Secretary of Defense hold an annual meeting with the leadership of each of the Services. These meetings are an opportunity for the Secretary of Defense to monitor the state of diversity in each of the Services. The meetings could focus on and revisit diversity management goals by going over key strategic metrics, analyses of the root causes of potential concerns, and potential action items for improvement. (Additional information and ideas related to these meetings are provided in the discussion of Recommendation 17.)

## **Conclusion**

The Commission believes that developing diversity leadership skills, establishing diversity as a military core value, and reporting on new key milestones throughout DoD and the Services will firmly communicate that the leadership's commitment to diversity is

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<sup>6</sup> The President is the Commander in Chief of the District of Columbia National Guard.

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absolute. The recommendations presented in this report are founded on military and private sector best practices and are the foundation for the way forward in an era of mission uncertainty.



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## **SECTION III: DEVELOPING FUTURE LEADERS**

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## CHAPTER FOUR

# THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF TODAY'S MILITARY LEADERSHIP

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Current and former military leaders have long argued that developing and maintaining qualified and demographically diverse leadership is critical for mission effectiveness (Becton et al., 2003; Lim et al., 2008). Specifically, they argue that the military should mirror the demographic composition of the population it serves and that senior leaders should mirror the demographic composition of the troops they lead. The chapters in this section (Chapters Four through Ten) present an analysis of how specific barriers at each stage of the military personnel life cycle influence the diversity of military leaders, and they provide recommendations designed to address these barriers and increase diversity at each of these stages.

Although the Commission's definition of diversity states that "diversity is all the different characteristics and attributes of individuals," the chapters in this section focus primarily on increasing racial/ethnic and gender representation within military leadership. The focus on racial/ethnic and gender representation is due to the fact that the MLDC charter specifically focuses on having the Commission evaluate "policies that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces." In addition, these categories represent historically and socially relevant groups and are more easily measured than other, unobservable individual attributes (Cox, 1994). The importance of increasing racial/ethnic and gender representation within the military has also been a specific priority of senior military leaders and is argued to be critical to mission effectiveness (see Lim et al., 2008). Where appropriate, the Commission also makes recommendations for improving the representation of broader dimensions of diversity, such as structural, language, and cultural diversity.

This chapter offers an overview of the demographic composition of current military leadership. It documents that *military officers today are less demographically diverse than both the enlisted troops they lead and the broader civilian population they serve*. It concludes with the anatomy of the life cycle of a military career.

Chapters Five through Nine are organized around the stages of the military personnel life cycle, each of which promotes or impedes career advancement. Unlike other private and public organizations, the military operates as a closed personnel system. Senior leaders cannot be brought in from the outside but are instead brought up through the lower ranks. Therefore, each stage of the military personnel life cycle—from who is recruited to who is promoted—is intricately linked to the composition of future military leaders. By examining the policies and practices at each stage of the life cycle, the Commission was able to identify both barriers to advancement and potential

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policy levers for reducing those barriers for members of underrepresented demographic groups. Chapter Ten makes recommendations for promoting aspects of diversity that go beyond race/ethnicity and gender.

## Current Military Leadership Still Lags in Terms of Demographic Representation

Overall, the data show that the demographic composition of the officer corps is far from representative of the American population and that officers are much less demographically diverse than the enlisted troops they lead. With some exceptions, racial/ethnic minorities and women are also underrepresented among senior noncommissioned officers and flag/general officers compared with their representation in the ranks below.

The following sections draw on a common dataset provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) to make descriptive comparisons among all five Services. They offer demographic snapshots of military leadership for both the Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) in September 2008.

### The Officer Corps

Figure 4.1 shows that, relative to the enlisted forces, non-Hispanic blacks, Hispanics, and non-Hispanic others (i.e., American Indians, Alaska natives, and those of more than one race) were underrepresented among officers in both the AC and RC.<sup>1</sup> Only AC non-Hispanic Asian/Pacific Islander officers had representational parity compared with the enlisted force. Compared with the enlisted force, women were roughly equally represented or slightly overrepresented among the officer corps. Finally, compared with the U.S. population as a whole, both racial/ethnic minorities and women were underrepresented to various degrees in the officer corps.


### Senior Noncommissioned Officers and Flag/General Officers

Racial/ethnic minorities were also largely underrepresented among senior noncommissioned officers and flag/general officers in most of the Services compared with their representation in the ranks below. Figure 4.2 shows that, compared with their representation in ranks E-1 through E-6, among senior noncommissioned officers, racial/ethnic minorities were underrepresented in the AC of the Air Force, the Coast Guard, and the Navy and overrepresented in the Army and the Marine Corps. In the RC,


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<sup>1</sup> These figures are intended to be descriptive in nature. In making comparisons across groups, we calculated representation indexes in which each representation index is equal to the ratio of the reference group's share of the population to its share of the population in the comparison group (e.g., the ratio of the share of officers to the share of enlisted personnel). Values greater than one indicate overrepresentation, values less than one indicate underrepresentation, and values equal to one indicate representational parity. As a rule of thumb, we identified a group as being over or underrepresented based on whether there was at least a  $\pm 0.10$  difference from 1.0. Only the conclusions based on these representation indexes, and not the indexes themselves, are presented in this chapter.

## THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF TODAY'S MILITARY LEADERSHIP

**Figure 4.1. Racial/Ethnic Minority and Female Shares of Officers and Enlisted Personnel, by Component, September 2008**

SOURCES: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009; U.S. Census Bureau, 2008.

**Figure 4.2. Racial/Ethnic Minority Shares of Enlisted Personnel, by Service and Rank, September 2008**

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009.

## FROM REPRESENTATION TO INCLUSION: DIVERSITY LEADERSHIP FOR THE 21ST-CENTURY MILITARY


compared with ranks E-1 through E-6, racial/ethnic minorities were underrepresented in all Services except the Army and the Marine Corps Reserves.

Figure 4.3 shows that, compared with their representation in ranks E-1 through E-6, women were also underrepresented among senior noncommissioned officers across almost all the Services and in both the AC and RC. The only exception to this pattern was in the Marine Corps Reserves, where women in ranks E-1 through E-6 had approximate representational parity with noncommissioned officers. However, women in the Marine Corps Reserves constituted less than 5 percent of all enlisted Marine Corps Reserve personnel—the lowest share across all the Services.

Figure 4.4 shows that, compared with their representation among officers of ranks O-1 through O-6, racial/ethnic minorities were underrepresented among flag/general officers across all Services in both the AC and RC. However, it should be noted that, because the number of these officers was small, any change in the demographic composition could have significantly affected the percentages.

Figure 4.5 shows that, compared with their representation among officers of ranks O-1 through O-6, women were also underrepresented among flag/general officers across almost all Services in both the AC and RC. The only exceptions to the general pattern were the Marine Corps and Navy RCs, where women actually constituted a greater percentage of the flag/general officer population compared with their presence in ranks O-1 through O-6.<sup>2</sup>


**Figure 4.3. Female Shares of Enlisted Personnel, by Service and Rank, September 2008**




SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009.

<sup>2</sup> It must be noted, however, that the *number* of female flag officers in the Marine Corps Reserve was one.

## THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF TODAY'S MILITARY LEADERSHIP

**Figure 4.4. Racial/Ethnic Minority Shares of Officers, by Service and Grade, September 2008**

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009.

**Figure 4.5. Female Shares of Officers, by Service and Grade, September 2008**

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009.

## FROM REPRESENTATION TO INCLUSION: DIVERSITY LEADERSHIP FOR THE 21ST-CENTURY MILITARY

## Summary

These data show that, as of September 2008, officers were generally less demographically diverse than both the enlisted troops they led and the civilian population they served. In addition, compared with their representation in the ranks below, racial/ethnic minorities and women were underrepresented among senior noncommissioned officers across several Services in both the AC and RC. Finally, women (with the exceptions noted above) and racial/ethnic minorities were underrepresented among flag/general officers in both the AC and RC.

Given the desire to develop and maintain a military leadership that is demographically representative of the American public, it follows that military leadership should also represent the servicemembers it is entrusted to lead. Leaders from racial/ethnic and cultural backgrounds similar to those of the U.S. citizenry have the potential to inspire future servicemembers and engender trust among the population. Demographic similarities between the enlisted corps and its leaders can equally inspire and facilitate greater confidence. Also, given the fact that American demography is rapidly changing, it is important to design future policies that will shape personnel trends in desired ways. Advancing understanding of how the military personnel life cycle both promotes and impedes members of underrepresented demographic groups from achieving leadership positions is a critical first step.


## Stages of the Military Personnel Life Cycle

As previously explained, unlike other private and public organizations, the military operates as a closed personnel system. Senior leaders cannot be brought in from the outside but are instead brought up through the ranks. Therefore, each stage of the military personnel life cycle—from who is recruited to who is promoted—is intricately linked to the composition of future military leaders. Figure 4.6 provides an overview of the key stages of the military personnel life cycle and illustrates how the demographic composition of military leadership is shaped by the cumulative effects of barriers at each stage.

As Figure 4.6 shows, the demographic diversity of future military leaders is first shaped by who is eligible to serve and by the ability of outreach and recruiting strategies to attract members from all demographic groups. Following this, career field and assignment decisions, which are shaped by both policy and individual preferences, influence the overall demographic composition within each career field and within key assignments. The career fields and assignments held by servicemembers then play a role in overall career progression and in the resulting demographic composition of those who advance to higher ranks. In the military, however, career progression is a function of both retention and promotion. That is, potential differences in who chooses to remain in and who chooses to separate from the military influence the composition of the available promotion pool. Together, these stages of the military personnel life cycle—and the resulting demographic composition at each stage—determine the final demographic diversity of senior leaders.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF TODAY'S MILITARY LEADERSHIP

**Figure 4.6. All Stages of the Military Personnel Life Cycle Affect the Demographic Composition of Military Leadership**



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At any stage of the personnel life cycle, a number of barriers may arise to impede career progression to higher ranks. These barriers are both structural and perceptual. Structural barriers are “prerequisites or requirements that exclude minorities [and women] to a relatively greater extent than non-Hispanic whites [and men]” and are “inherent in the policies and procedures of the institution” (Kirby et al., 2000). Perceptual barriers are “perceptions, attitudes, or beliefs that lead minorities [and women] to think they cannot or should not pursue . . . a job or career option” (Kirby et al., 2000).

Chapters Five through Nine are organized around each stage of the military personnel life cycle and its associated barriers, as illustrated in Figure 4.6:

- military eligibility requirements
- outreach and recruiting
- branching and assignments
- promotion
- retention.

Each chapter describes the barriers that characterize that stage of the life cycle and explores their effects on the demographic composition of senior military leaders. Each chapter includes the Commission’s recommendations for addressing those barriers and increasing the proportion of demographic minorities that make it to the next stage of the life cycle. Chapter Ten describes barriers and related policy recommendations for promoting other important diversity dimensions, such as language, cultural expertise, and structural diversity brought by the RC. A more in-depth discussion of methods and findings related to a specific stage in the military personnel life cycle can be found in the relevant Commission issue papers and decision papers.

## CHAPTER FIVE

# THE ELIGIBLE POOL OF CANDIDATES

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The pool of individuals from which the military can recruit is defined by specific eligibility requirements that can present a structural barrier to service. Although the specific eligibility requirements differ across the Services, in general, those who wish to serve must first meet standards related to age, citizenship, number of dependents, financial status, education level, aptitude, substance abuse, language skills, moral conduct, height and weight, physical fitness, and medical qualifications (see Asch et al., 2009).<sup>1</sup> Together, these requirements define the eligible population from which the Services can recruit. Currently, however, a large portion of young people are not eligible to join the military. In fact, statistics released by the Pentagon show that 75 percent of young people ages 17–24 are currently not eligible to enlist (Gilroy, 2009). Furthermore, racial/ethnic minorities and, in some cases, women tend to meet these eligibility requirements at lower rates than whites and men.

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the impact of such requirements on the demographic profile of recruits. Figure 5.1 shows how some basic Marine Corps enlisted requirements shaped the profile of the population that was eligible to enlist in 2009. For example, the education requirement (i.e., high school graduation or General Educational Development diploma) and the minimum Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score requirement reduced the share of non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics who could enlist, and the weight and body fat requirements decreased the share of women who could enlist.


Similar patterns are seen in the eligible officer population. Besides height, weight, and medical standards, commissioned officers must have U.S. citizenship and a bachelor's degree, and they must complete a commissioning program (i.e., the Reserve Officers' Training Corps [ROTC], Officer Candidate School/Officer Training School [OCS/OTS], or a Service academy), each of which has its own unique standards for admission. Again using Marine Corps requirements as an example, Figure 5.2 shows how the percentage shares of the eligible population for each demographic group in 2009 changed with the successive addition of each requirement. The share of non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics decreased considerably with the addition of the college degree requirement, and the share of female and “other” representation increased.<sup>2</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> In certain circumstances, some of these eligibility requirements can be waived. Which requirements can be waived (and when) varies by Service.

<sup>2</sup> The order of the requirements is arbitrary. We could have applied the citizenship requirement before the college-attainment requirement, and it would have shown a “bigger” effect among Hispanics.

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
**Figure 5.1. The Cumulative Effect of Individual Requirements on the Demographic Composition of the Eligible Enlisted Population, Marine Corps, 2009**



SOURCES: Center for Human Research, 2005; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2006; U.S. Census Bureau, 2007.

NOTES: The "other" category includes Asians, American Indians/Alaska natives, Pacific Islanders, and those of unknown/missing race/ethnicity.

**Figure 5.2. The Cumulative Effect of Individual Requirements on the Demographic Composition of the Eligible Officer Population, Marine Corps, 2009**



SOURCES: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2006; U.S. Census Bureau, 2007.

NOTE: The "other" category includes Asians, American Indians/Alaska natives, Pacific Islanders, and those of unknown/missing race/ethnicity.

female share of the eligible population again decreased with the addition of weight and body fat requirements.

Thus, as illustrated above, the requirements to enlist and to become a commissioned officer shape the demographic profile of eligible recruits, with racial/ethnic minorities and, in some cases, women being disqualified at higher rates. Although there are some differences in how the other Services' requirements shape the profiles of their eligible populations, the overall patterns and effects are the same.

These same requirements also dramatically reduce the overall size of the eligible pool of candidates from which the Services can recruit. In addition to decreasing the number of racial/ethnic minorities and women that are eligible, they also decrease the number of white men that are eligible for Service—just at lower rates. This lack of eligibility among today's youth has been identified as a key concern in the recent *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, which states that,

in coming years, we will face additional challenges to our ability to attract qualified young men and women into the armed forces. Among them are a large and growing proportion of youth who are ineligible to serve in the military for medical, criminal, ethical, or physical reasons. (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010)

## **Stakeholders Should Develop and Engage in Activities to Expand the Pool of Qualified Candidates**

### *Recommendation 6—*

*The shrinking pool of qualified candidates for service in the Armed Forces is a threat to national security. The stakeholders listed below should develop and engage in activities that will expand the pool of qualified candidates.*

- *a. The President, Congress, and State and local officials should develop, resource, and implement strategies to address current eligibility issues.*
- *b. DoD and DHS (Coast Guard) should*
  - *Create and leverage formal partnerships with other stakeholders.*
  - *Institutionalize and promote citizenship programs for the Services.*
  - *Require the Services to review and validate their eligibility criteria for military service.*
- *c. DoD and the Services should focus on early engagement. They should conduct strategic evaluations of the effectiveness of their current K-12 outreach programs and practices and increase resources and support for those that are found to be effective.*

This recommendation proposes that all stakeholders, and primarily key public officials, develop and engage in activities that will expand the pool of qualified candidates for military service. It is important to note that the intention of this recommendation is not to lower eligibility requirements but instead to involve stakeholders in activities designed to bring the qualifications of today's youth up to par with current

## FROM REPRESENTATION TO INCLUSION: DIVERSITY LEADERSHIP FOR THE 21ST-CENTURY MILITARY

eligibility requirements. The Commission proposes three key strategies for achieving this goal.

## **Develop, Resource, and Implement Strategies to Address Current Eligibility Issues**

U.S. military readiness, and thus national security, will depend on the ability of the upcoming generation to serve. Therefore, a shrinking pool of eligible individuals poses a critical threat to military readiness. Although addressing this particular national security issue is well outside the control, missions, responsibilities, and resources of DoD and DHS, it is the collective national security responsibility of the President, Congress, and State and local officials. These top officials have the deep understanding and powerful capability to turn the tide on this issue by developing and executing strong, united, action-oriented programs to improve eligibility by crafting, resourcing, and implementing an integrated and sustainable set of strategies. Addressing such goals as high-quality early education and appropriate in-school fitness plans can ensure that more young Americans meet the standards of the U.S. military and that the military will be capable of keeping America strong and safe.

## **DoD and DHS (Coast Guard) Should Engage in Several Initiatives**

### ***Create and Leverage Formal Partnerships with Other Stakeholders***

It is not part of the DoD or DHS mission to address the educational attainment issues or other problems affecting American youth. However, given the large number of young people who do not qualify for military service, and particularly the large number of racial/ethnic minority youth in this group, DoD and DHS could partner with other federal departments, federal agencies, and State and local agencies whose job it is to address these issues. Therefore, the Commission recommends that DoD and DHS develop or expand current formal partnerships with such entities as the Department of Education, the Department of Health and Human Services, and similar agencies at the State and local levels.

### ***Institutionalize and Promote Citizenship Programs for the Services***

In an effort to further expand the pool of qualified candidates, the Commission recommends institutionalizing and promoting successful citizenship programs. One such program is the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program, which was authorized as a pilot program on November 25, 2008, by the Secretary of Defense.

Although noncitizens have served in the military throughout history, changes in law have limited their service. According to Title 10, Section 504(b)(1), enlisted personnel must be U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents of the United States (i.e., green card holders), or citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, or Palau. This requirement disqualifies thousands of otherwise eligible legal noncitizens from service in the U.S. military. However, a provision within this same law allows a Service Secretary to authorize the enlistment of a person, regardless of citizenship status, if the Secretary determines that such enlistment is “vital to the

## THE ELIGIBLE POOL OF CANDIDATES

national interest.” This provision is the basis of the MAVNI program and, before the inception of the program, was used only extremely rarely.

Currently, the MAVNI program expands the eligible recruiting market to non-citizens who do not have green cards but are legally present in the United States if they are licensed health care professionals or if they speak at least one of 35 critical foreign languages. This group includes noncitizens with certain student or work visas, refugees, asylees, and individuals with temporary protected status. MAVNI recruits are not only individuals with specialized skills that could greatly benefit the military: They also tend to be among the more highly qualified recruits. Thus, MAVNI represents a viable option for expanding the eligible recruiting pool to highly qualified, legal noncitizens who could greatly increase not only racial/ethnic but also linguistic and cultural diversity throughout the military. The Commission recommends both institutionalizing this pilot program to make it a permanent Service option and increasing the number of slots available for eligible MAVNI candidates. In addition, the Commission recommends both allowing those with other critically needed specialties to access via MAVNI and exploring the possibility of expanding the program to the RC. (Currently, MAVNI permits only those who are health care professionals to serve in the RC.) Finally, although there are many barriers to clearance and citizenship for officers, the Commission also recommends exploring ways to expand MAVNI to precommissioning officer programs, such as ROTC.

### ***Review and Validate Eligibility Criteria for Military Service***

The Commission recommends that DoD and DHS (Coast Guard) require the Services to review and validate their eligibility requirements to ensure that all requirements are mission essential. This recommendation is in no way advocating lowering the entrance standards. Instead, this recommendation is intended to ensure that all of the Service eligibility requirements are necessary and have been validated. In other words, the goal of this recommendation is to ensure that no individual is unnecessarily excluded from service. Furthermore, ensuring that all requirements have been validated or are important predictors of key performance outcomes within each Service will help ensure that the best candidates are selected to join the military. It is important to note that there has already been extensive research done to validate many military requirements, such as the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (see, for example, Armor & Roll, 1994; McHenry et al., 1990; and Ree & Earles, 1992). Therefore, those requirements that have been validated as strong predictors of key performance-related outcomes should continue to be used by the Services, and those that have not been validated should be examined to determine whether they are good predictors of key performance-related outcomes.

### **DoD and the Services Should Focus on Early Engagement**

To ensure that there is a large enough pool of qualified and demographically diverse candidates from which to recruit, the Commission believes in focusing on early engagement to help youth become and remain academically successful, physically fit, and successful citizens. It should be added that early engagement programs and initiatives

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should not be created with the sole goal of recruiting youth for the military at young ages. Instead, the Commission recommends that there be a renewed focus on good-citizenship programs that provide youth with opportunities for and guidance about achieving more successful futures, regardless of whether they join the military.

The Services already have a variety of outreach programs for youth in kindergarten through grade 12 (K-12). These range from programs designed to help students stay in school to programs focused specifically on introducing youth to science, technology, engineering, and math. However, it does not appear that these programs are consistently evaluated to determine the extent to which they achieve their stated goals. To ensure that the more successful programs are continued or expanded and to identify potential gaps in the curricula of outreach programs, the Commission recommends that DoD and the Services conduct a strategic evaluation of the effectiveness of current outreach programs. At a minimum, the programs should be evaluated to determine the extent to which they improve performance on key eligibility requirements, such as physical fitness, high school graduation rates, and performance on aptitude tests. Following this strategic evaluation, DoD and the Services should focus on increasing resources for programs that have been found to be effective at addressing some of the primary military disqualification factors.

The Commission also recommends increasing funding for the Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (JROTC) program, a Service-sponsored program operating within high schools.<sup>3</sup> JROTC is designed to promote good citizenship, leadership, physical fitness, motivation, and teamwork among young people. Participating students are urged to remain drug free and to successfully graduate from high school. The Commission is unaware of any studies examining the effectiveness of JROTC at achieving these outcomes while controlling for self-selection bias. However, the Services report that they track JROTC participants' attendance, high school graduation rates, indiscipline rates, drop-out rates, and grade point averages and compare these outcomes with those of non-JROTC participants. According to the Services, JROTC participants tend to outperform their nonparticipating peers on these outcomes. Based on this evidence, the Commission believes that JROTC appears to provide an important opportunity for outreach to racial/ethnic minorities and is associated with positive outcomes, indicating the potential to expand the pool of qualified youth not only for military service but also for the general workforce.

Finally, it is also important to note that there are nonprofit organizations outside of the Services that provide education and training to familiarize students with military culture, such as the Army Cadet Corps, the Civil Air Patrol Cadet Program, the Young Marines, the Devil Pups (Marine Corps), the Naval Sea Cadet Corps, and the Navy League Cadet Corps. Because these programs are not under the authority and control of the Services, they are not included as part of the Commission's strategic evaluation recommendation. However, the Services may want to both explore whether these programs are effective at producing outcomes desired by the Services and determine whether the Services could provide additional resources to such programs.

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<sup>3</sup> Detailed information on the JROTC Assessment can be found at ExpectMore.gov, 2006.

## CHAPTER SIX

# OUTREACH AND RECRUITING

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Given a limited pool of eligible candidates, outreach and recruiting strategies play a critical role in attracting *qualified* youth to military service. Furthermore, because the military operates as a closed personnel system, the demographic diversity of accessions directly influences the potential demographic diversity of future senior leaders. These factors underscore the importance of effective outreach and recruiting strategies within the Services. This chapter describes current outreach and recruiting practices across the Services, reports on the demographic composition of recent accessions, and recommends policies to improve the recruiting of racial/ethnic minorities and women.

## **Outreach and Recruiting Programs Used Across the Services**

During the Commission's October 2009 meeting, each Service presented a briefing on the outreach and recruiting programs it uses to attract members of currently underrepresented demographic groups. Although each Service has its own unique programs and practices, they often employ similar strategies. For example, the Services described establishing organizational divisions or offices specifically devoted to recruiting members of underrepresented demographic groups. They also conduct targeted advertising, such as creating marketing materials in multiple languages and advertising in college newspapers at Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Minority-Serving Institutions. They use media and entertainment marketing sources directed at demographically diverse audiences, such as Telemundo, Black Entertainment Television, and such racial/ethnic minority-oriented publications as *Jet*, *The Root*, and *The Black Collegian*. They work to establish connections with key community influencers (e.g., leaders, educators, administrators) and affinity groups, including by sending representatives to affinity-group events where high-quality candidates might be found. Such events include annual conferences conducted by the National Society of Black Engineers and the Society for Advancement of Chicanos and Native Americans in Science. Finally, the Services also work to increase their own general visibility through social networking sites and participation in community mentoring programs.

## **Outreach and Recruiting Programs Across Officer Commissioning Sources**

There are four main commissioning sources for officers (see Thirtle, 2001). These are direct appointments (usually of civilians who serve in occupations—such as law, medicine, and the chaplain corps—requiring advanced education), Service academies (which are four-year-degree-granting institutions), ROTC programs (which students attend

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while pursuing their bachelor's degree), and OCS/OTS (which are designed for candidates that already have a bachelor's degree). These programs pursue similar recruiting strategies as those just described, but they also use a few methods and programs that are specific to their institutional needs.

For example, the Service academies report using a number of key strategies to attract high-quality applicants from all demographic groups. These include providing summer seminar programs and candidate-parent weekend visits to promote exposure of their academies and targeting recruiting at high schools that serve a high number of racial/ethnic minority students. They also report making use of academy preparatory schools and other academic-improvement programs designed to increase the eligibility of potential applicants. Finally, the academies reported holding a Service Academy Diversity Conference at which directors and chief diversity officers from the Service academies share knowledge and synchronize efforts.

Like the Service academies, ROTC and OCS/OTS programs use many of the outreach and recruiting methods of the general Services. However, they too have several programs designed specifically to attract, from all demographic backgrounds, high-quality applicants who either have a college degree or have expressed an intent to attend college. These include strategically establishing ROTC programs and academic scholarships at Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Minority-Serving Institutions and maintaining a targeted OCS/OTS recruiting presence at these same universities for students who are ready to graduate.

### **Outreach and Recruiting Programs for the National Guard and Reserve**

The National Guard and Reserve use many of the same recruiting strategies discussed above and, in fact, participate in some of the same programs used by their active-duty counterparts. However, because of their local nature, many National Guard and Reserve recruiting efforts are focused on their surrounding communities. This is particularly true of the National Guard because it is, in effect, composed of 54 separate State entities that recruit almost exclusively within their States.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, although Reserve units can recruit both nationally and locally, a good portion of Reserve recruiting efforts are also locally focused. This is because Reserve members are not generally reimbursed for the cost of traveling from home to drill site, so Reserve units are much more likely to attract and retain local members.

This means that the National Guard and Reserve have developed unique strategies focused on local communities. These include engaging key community leaders and educators and attending local fairs, sports games, and other community events. This close interaction with communities makes the National Guard and Reserve a particularly effective bridge between the Armed Forces and civilian communities.

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<sup>1</sup> Throughout the discussion of the National Guard, *States* includes U.S. territories and the District of Columbia. Note that, although it is not uncommon for individuals from out of state to join a local National Guard unit, State National Guards do not actively recruit outside their States.

## The Demographic Diversity of Recent Accessions

As previously described, the Services use a number of different outreach and recruiting programs targeted toward increasing the demographic diversity of accessions. Unfortunately, there is currently little research on the effectiveness of these individual programs at achieving their specified outcomes or attracting youth to enlist or enroll in precommissioning officer programs. Data on recent enlisted and officer accessions, however, can provide a baseline measure of how well current outreach and recruiting strategies are working to attract qualified candidates from all demographic groups. This section presents an overview of how recent AC enlisted and officer accessions compare with the eligible recruiting pool in terms of demographic representation. Data on recent RC accessions are not included because comparisons with the eligible population would need to be done on a State-by-State basis. In addition, a large percentage of RC enlisted accessions (i.e., 36 percent of Selected Reserve) and a majority of RC officer accessions (i.e., 87 percent of Selected Reserve) are “prior service” accessions who have transferred from the AC.<sup>2</sup> Issues related to helping servicemembers transition from the AC to the RC are addressed elsewhere in this report.

For accession data, the Commission used a common dataset from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (FY 2002–FY 2008), which provides the data in a report series called *Population Representation in the Military Services*. The accession data presented below are from FY 2007 and FY 2008, which are the most recently published datasets. The eligible recruiting pool benchmark was created using data from the March 2008 Current Population Survey (U.S. Census Bureau, 1973–2008). For enlisted accessions, the eligible recruiting pool was defined as labor force participants (i.e., people who are either employed or actively seeking work) who hold high school degrees (or equivalents) through four years of college (but hold no bachelor’s degree) and are between the ages of 18 and 24. For officer accessions, the eligible recruiting pool was defined as labor force participants who hold at least a bachelor’s degree and are between the ages of 22 and 34.

### Enlisted Accessions

With the exception of the Navy, which had roughly equal or overrepresentation of every nonwhite race/ethnicity group, each Service had one or more racial/ethnic minority group that was underrepresented compared with its representation in the eligible recruiting pool:

- Hispanics and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented in recent Army accessions.
- Non-Hispanic blacks and Asians were underrepresented in recent Marine Corps accessions.

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<sup>2</sup> Based on data from Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.

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- Hispanics and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented in recent Air Force accessions.
- Non-Hispanic blacks and Asians were underrepresented in recent Coast Guard accessions.

Additionally, although women constituted close to 50 percent of the eligible recruiting pool, they were underrepresented in recent enlisted accessions across all Services, constituting between only 7 percent (Marine Corps) and 22 percent (Air Force) of those accessions.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the data show that there were several underrepresented demographic groups in recent enlisted accessions across the Services.

### **Officer Accessions**

As in the recent enlisted accessions, there was considerable variation across the Services and, in particular, across the commissioning sources in terms of racial/ethnic and gender representation in recent officer accessions. Overall, the data showed that, compared with the eligible recruiting pool, there were in each Service several underrepresented race/ethnicity groups in the various officer commissioning sources:

- Hispanics and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented in recent Navy officer accessions.
- Hispanics, non-Hispanic Asians, and non-Hispanic others (American Indians, Pacific Islanders, Alaska natives, and those reporting more than one race) were underrepresented in recent Army officer accessions.
- Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks, and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented in recent Marine Corps officer accessions.
- Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks, and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented in recent Air Force officer accessions. However, the degree of “unknown” racial/ethnic accessions in the data was so large that it calls into question the accuracy of the data and the conclusions for the other groups.
- Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks, and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented in recent Coast Guard officer accessions.

In addition, although women constituted more than 50 percent of the recruiting pool, they were underrepresented across all Services and commissioning sources.

Although the Services are currently engaged in a number of outreach and recruiting efforts, there is little information on the individual effectiveness of these various programs and practices. However, data on recent accessions suggest that, across the Services, racial/ethnic minorities and women are still underrepresented even when compared with only the eligible population. Therefore, if the Services wish to reflect the demographics of the larger population, there needs to be further improvement in the outreach and recruiting efforts targeting members of underrepresented demographic groups.

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<sup>3</sup> As is discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven, not all occupations are open to women. This may influence accession shares for women.

## Improve Recruiting from the Currently Available Pool of Qualified Candidates

### *Recommendation 7—*

*DoD and the Services should engage in activities to improve recruiting from the currently available pool of qualified candidates by*

- *a. Creating, implementing, and evaluating a strategic plan for outreach to, and recruiting from, untapped locations and underrepresented demographic groups.*
- *b. Creating more accountability for recruiting from underrepresented demographic groups.*
- *c. Developing a common application for Service ROTC and academy programs.*
- *d. Closely examining the preparatory school admissions processes and making required changes to ensure that accessions align with the needs of the military.*

## Create, Implement, and Evaluate a Strategic Plan for Outreach and Recruiting from Untapped Locations and Underrepresented Demographic Groups

All of the Services have recruiting strategies—including many promising outreach programs—directed at demographically diverse populations. The Commission would like to see these initiatives continue and be expanded through having the Services evaluate the effectiveness of current spending on minority marketing and recruiting initiatives and then develop a clear strategic plan that will be submitted to DoD and DHS (Coast Guard) for evaluation. The strategic plan should include an examination of untapped recruiting markets of qualified racial/ethnic minorities, such as recruiting at two-year colleges and strategically locating ROTC host units.

### ***Explore Recruiting at Two-Year Colleges***

Recent data suggest that close to 50 percent of all students in college attended two-year colleges, with slightly higher percentages of blacks and Hispanics attending two-year colleges than average (National Center for Education Statistics, 2008). Specifically, close to 60 percent of Hispanics attending college went to two-year colleges, and a little over half of blacks attending college went to two-year colleges. Furthermore, research done for the Navy found that those with two-year college degrees had higher test scores and higher continuation and reenlistment rates than those with only high school degrees (Kraus et al., 2004). Therefore, two-year colleges may represent a rich market for recruiting not only high-quality enlisted recruits but also high-quality Hispanic and black recruits.

Two-year colleges may represent a rich market for ROTC recruits. A candidate must have completed a bachelor's degree before commissioning through an ROTC program. However, roughly 17 percent of all students attending two-year colleges transfer to four-year colleges. This includes roughly 19 percent of Hispanics and 8 percent of blacks who later transfer to four-year colleges. These members of underrepresented demographic groups could be targeted for ROTC.


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***Examine Expanding ROTC Hosts to More-Demographically Diverse Locations***

A second way to improve recruiting of racial/ethnic minorities is to ensure that ROTC host locations match the geographic distribution of student populations. The map shown in Figure 6.1 uses Air Force ROTC units to illustrate this point. In the figure, all Air Force ROTC host locations are identified by red triangles. The locations of black students are represented by circles, with larger circles indicating larger populations. The locations of Hispanic students are represented by stars, with larger stars indicating larger populations. Locations that have large populations of black students or Hispanic students (or both) but no ROTC host are potential areas for expanding ROTC demographic diversity and increasing the production of officers. The map shows that there are potentially rich markets in Texas, the southeastern United States, California, and the mid-Atlantic region. Of course, the locations of other Service ROTC units should also be taken into account when examining potential areas for expansion.

In addition, given that the Services have limited resources and that the location of ROTC sites involves many stakeholders, the Commission recommends instituting an independent council similar to the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission to evaluate and decide where new ROTC units should be placed and where unproductive ROTC units would best be moved. A key factor to be considered as part

**Figure 6.1. Comparison of Air Force ROTC Host Locations and Student Body Demographics**



SOURCES: National Center for Education Statistics, 2008; U.S. Census Bureau, 2007.

of this process is the extent to which ROTC host units are located at colleges and universities with large student populations of racial/ethnic minorities.

### **Create More Accountability for Recruiting from Underrepresented Demographic Groups**

The Commission recommends that DoD and the Services create more accountability for recruiting racial/ethnic minorities and women by developing goals for qualified minority applicants to precommissioning officer programs, developing formal processes for coordinating enlisted and officer recruiting, and working to improve congressional nominations to the Service academies.

#### ***Develop Goals for Qualified Minority Applicants***

The Services have long employed incentive programs for recruiters to ensure that designated accession goals are met. This includes setting goals for the total number of accessions and goals for recruiting individuals with specific attributes, such as a high aptitude level (e.g., a high AFQT score) or specific skills or degrees (see Oken & Asch, 1997). One way to ensure that there is a demographically diverse candidate pool from which to select applicants into precommissioning officer programs is to develop goals for qualified minority applicants. This strategy is currently employed by the Navy and the Marine Corps but not by the other Services. The goals would not be used during the actual admissions decision but would help ensure that there is a demographically diverse pool from which to select new students each year. These goals should be developed with careful consideration of the demographics of the eligible population.

#### ***Coordinate Enlisted and Officer Recruiting***

The Commission recommends that the Services explore developing formal processes for coordinating enlisted and officer recruiting. Except in the Coast Guard, enlisted recruiters are primarily focused on finding enlisted recruits. If they find a prospect with a bachelor's degree, they are required to refer that person to the highest program for which he or she is eligible, and they must have the prospect sign a waiver if he or she prefers to enlist instead of joining an officer commissioning program. However, this coordination does not necessarily apply for high-quality applicants without a bachelor's degree, even if they have the potential to be successful in a precommissioning officer program. Therefore, a formal coordination process between enlisted recruiters on one hand and academy and ROTC programs on the other could help ensure that qualified applicants from all demographic backgrounds have the opportunity to become officers.

#### ***Improve Congressional Academy Nominations***

In addition to meeting the minimum eligibility requirements, potential applicants to the DoD Service academies must secure a nomination from the President, the Vice President, or a member of Congress to apply.<sup>4</sup> However, there was general agreement

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<sup>4</sup> For the United States Air Force Academy, the nomination must come from the Vice President or a member of Congress (U.S. Air Force, 2009). For the United States Military Academy, the nomination can be a Service-connected nomination or congressional nomination (U.S. Army, 2007). For the United States

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among the Service academy representatives who briefed the Commission in October 2009 that available nomination slots are often not fully utilized. Furthermore, recent media reports have highlighted that lawmakers from areas with large racial/ethnic minority populations tend to rank near the bottom when it comes to making nominations for appointment to the academies (Witte, 2009). The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), is working with members of Congress to improve their use of nominations, so efforts to engage members of Congress in the academy nomination process are already ongoing. The goal of this recommendation is both to encourage members of Congress to improve their use of nominations and to ensure that any current OSD efforts to improve congressional nominations are sustained over the long term.

### **Develop a Common Application for Service ROTC and Academy Programs**

Currently, each Service academy and ROTC program requires a separate application. Therefore, young people who are interested in multiple schools or programs must apply separately, with sharing of applicant files occurring inconsistently. Also, students may not be aware of all of their options in terms of military commissioning programs. Therefore, the Commission recommends a joint or common application for Service ROTC and academy programs. Through this coordination, students could apply simultaneously to multiple programs, ensuring that they are exposed to all of the options for becoming officers.

### **Closely Examine the Preparatory School Admissions Process and Make Required Changes to Ensure That Accessions Align with the Needs of the Military**

The Service academy preparatory schools originated when President Woodrow Wilson expanded the United States Military Academy's corps of cadets in 1916, authorizing 180 slots for prior enlisted personnel (Malstrom, 2009). The reality at the time, however, was that few enlisted personnel would be capable of transitioning directly to a Service academy without additional academic preparation. The idea of Service academy preparatory schools (for both the Army and the Navy) came about as a way to meet this need. Although there are also private military preparatory schools with programs designed to prepare prospective Service academy appointees, most of the cadets who reach Service academies via the preparatory school route attend the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School, the Naval Academy Preparatory School, or the U.S. Air Force Academy Preparatory School. The Coast Guard Academy does not have its own preparatory school. Prior to 2009, the Coast Guard Academy sent some prospective cadets to the Naval Academy Preparatory School. Since 2009, however, the Coast Guard Academy has used only private programs to serve the preparatory school function because the private programs were found to be more cost-effective than the Naval Academy Preparatory School. The modern purpose of the preparatory schools still

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Naval Academy, the nomination must come from the President, the Vice President, or a member of Congress (U.S. Marine Corps, 2010). The Coast Guard Academy does not require a nomination.

## OUTREACH AND RECRUITING

includes their original mission of providing additional preparation for prior enlisted personnel, but it has been generalized to offer opportunities for civilian applicants.

According to data provided by the Services to the Commission, the preparatory schools are currently an important source of racial/ethnic minority enrollment at the Service academies. However, an examination of preparatory school records suggests that there is a large focus on developing athletes to enter into the academies. Approximately 35–40 percent of each of the preparatory school's recent classes consisted of recruited athletes. Although physical fitness is an important characteristic for military officers, the Commission feels some concern that the focus on preparing athletes for the Service academies may be coming at the expense of individuals with other skills that may be more beneficial to the current and future needs of the military. Therefore, the Commission recommends that DoD have the preparatory schools closely examine their admissions processes and make any required changes to ensure that accessions align with the needs of the future military workforce.

